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ABSTRACT
A tale of two ports, namely Hong Kong International Container Terminal
(Container Port) and Cyberport is presented in this dissertation which
endeavours to examine their planning success and failure. It is recognised
that the Government acted as a good coordinator in the successful Container
Port development, who has given supports to private container operators
since 1960s when the concept of containerization had been appreciated and
adopted world-widely. Contrasting to Container Port, Cyberport has been
developed mainly under the initiation by Government.
After reviewing the development history and business performance of both
ports, the author came up with a major argument, which is the role of
Government engaged in the development of Container Port and Cyberport
determined their success and failure. Concerning the two ports development,
it is concluded that in a laissez faire economy, successful development is
mainly driven by market itself while the Government is recommended to be
a coordinator rather than an initiator.
1CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
The two “ports” discussed in this dissertation are the Hong Kong
International Container Terminal (Container Port or Container Terminal)
and Cyberport. The evolution of Container Port was traced back to 1842
when Hong Kong was still an entrepot. With both the Government and
private sectors’ participation, wide attention had been paid to
containerization in 1960s. After the concept of containerization had been
studied, within ten years, the Kwai Chung Container Terminal was ranked
the fourth largest in the world and second largest in Asia. The business of
Container Terminal was realized to be very successful. Up till now, the
Container Terminal in Hong Kong has still maintained its position as the
world’s busiest port. In the evolution of Container Port, the shift away from
the historic cargo handling methods and centres was in part being pushed by
the industry itself. However, without a solid basis provided by the
Government for supporting the new system, the progress was believed to be
slow because the industry tended not to abandon its existing bases.
Therefore, both the Government and private sectors played an important role
in moving the Container Port in Hong Kong to be an international port.
2On the other hand, the development of Cyberport was mainly under the
Government’s initiation with this idea originated from Pacific Century
Group (PCG) because the Government believed that Cyberport could act as
an IT flagship, an essential infrastructure to form a strategic cluster of
information services companies to meet the challenges of the 21st Century.
After the Government’s announcement of the development Cyberport
project, the involvement of private sectors started as the Government
appreciated on their expertise and entrepreneurial spirit. Contrast with the
usual practice, this project was awarded to the PCG without a formal tender
process.
It is also interesting to note that although Cyberport was planned to be a
leading information technology centre of the Asia-Pacific region, large
amount of residential area (Residence Bel-Air) had been developed. This
created a scandal upon both the Government and PCG because the
Cyberport was alleged to be a deal between the Government and PCG aimed
at favouring PCG. The interest rewarded to PCG upon the construction of
Cyberport is the real estate interest. At the beginning of the project, the
private sector was planned by the Government to be the major shareholder
of Cyberport project, but upon the completion of the project, it finally turned
out that the capital contribution by Government is 64.5 percent of the total
equity of the project, in other words, the current major shareholder of
3Cyberport project is the Government instead of private sector whose capital
contribution is only 35.5 percent.
One significant contrast between Container Port and Cyberport is that the
former one is built on an existing, powerful, forward moving industry in
which both the private sector and government had devoted their effort in the
evolution. While the Cyberport development was mainly driven by the
Government. However, the whole project had appeared to be a real estate
development rather than a Hong Kong’s information technology flagship,
the original picture in the mindset of the Government. In this dissertation, I
will evaluate the performance of the Container Port and the Cyberport
followed by an investigation of the corresponding reasons of their success or
failure.
OBJECTIVES
The objectives of this dissertation are threefold and as follows,
1. To study the history and nature of the Container Port and the
Cyberport
2. To determine the initiating forces of the developments of the
Container Port and the Cyberport
3. To evaluate the performance of the Container Port and the Cyberport
and investigate the corresponding reasons of their success or failure
4METHODOLOGY
For this dissertation, an extensive literature review of books, articles, and
journals was carried out. To discuss the role of Government in a laissez faire
economy, the cases of Container Port and Cyberport concerning their ways
of planning and development are studied. The literature review mainly
focused on the concept of planning by Government and market in order to
understand the rationale of these different planning ways as well as the
concept of containerization for the purpose of understanding the container
industry development in a global aspect.
To evaluate the performance of Container Port and Cyberport, different
approaches had been used. For the former port, the forecast by Hong Kong
Port Development Board and Planning Development in the Port
development strategy reviews on the container and cargo throughput as well
as the business performance of container terminal operators would act as the
evaluating indicators. For the latter port, it would be evaluated in terms of
the residential portion and Cyberport portion. The business performance of
the residential portion could be reviewed in the financial statements of Hong
Kong Cyberport Development Holdings Ltd. (HKCD)
5Nevertheless, concerning the Cyberport portion, due to the unavailability of
financial statements of Hong Kong Cyberport Management Company Ltd,
the Cyberport portion could only be reviewed in the basis of the information
available in the press release, minutes of the legislative council consisting
the Report of Cyberport Project and financial statements of HKCD. For
business evaluation concerning the Cyberport office and the Le Méridien
Cyberport Hotel, comparison approach would be conducted by looking at
the occupancy rate and unit pricing rate of the Grade A office and 5-star
hotel in Hong Kong Island respectively. For a retail entertainment complex
(The Arcade), the evaluation is based on the observation from the site visits
conducted.
ORGANISATION
This dissertation has six chapters. Chapter One is the introduction, which
includes the background, objectives, and organization of this dissertation.
Chapter Two is the literature review, which includes the definitions and
reasons of planning, Pigovian and Coasian Paradigms concerning planning
by government and planning by market, reasons of planning failure and
finally a detailed discussion of containerization development. Chapter Three
and Chapter Four present the planning and development of Container Port
and Cyberport respectively including the historical review and their
6performances. Chapter Five examines the reasons of success and failure of
the two ports. Finally, Chapter Six is the conclusion, giving a summary of
the key issues of this dissertation.
7CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
DEFINITION OF PLANNING
Planning is categorized into two rather different but related meanings by
Peter Hall (Hall, 1980) according to the means of processing of “planning”.
First, it can refer to “a set of process whereby decision-making engage in
logical foresight before committing themselves” which include problem
definition, problem analysis, goal and objective setting, forecasting, problem
projection, design of alternative solutions, evaluation of alternative solutions,
decision processes, implementation processes, monitoring, control and
updating. These are common in the planning of many public activities such
as defence, economic development, education, public order and welfare.
But secondly, it can refer to “processes that result in a physical plan
showing the distribution of activities and their related structures in
geographical space” (Hall, 1980). This kind of planning is also known as
physical planning, or town and country planning, or urban and regional
planning.
8REASONS OF PLANNING
According to Lai (1997a), the modern planning is generally considered to be
the outcome of three major factors in European experience in the 19th
Century. First, the town planning emerged in the later stages of the industrial
revolution in order to overcome the new problems associated with
urbanization. Second, planning was seen as a way to cope with problems of
poverty and education which were redefined as “social problems” capable of
being managed through new professions like planning and social work. The
third reason is the invention of the modern economy. In historical
perspective, European pre-war economic thoughts and political experience
influenced heavily on the planning of the post-World War II. As a result,
planning was believed as a profession dealing with the techniques, activities,
procedures and management of government interventions in spatial and
socio-economic affairs in terms of economic reasoning suggested by
Escobar (Escobar, 1992). Escobar suggested three general factors of the
emergence of planning which corresponded to the policy issues. First, the
efficiency in resource allocation in the presence of “market failure” was
concerned, namely the existence of externalities, problems of providing
public goods and the existence of monopoly under the profit mechanism in
the process of industrialization and urbanization. Second, there was a desire
for equity in income, wealth distribution and opportunity. Third, Pigovian
9micro-economic and Keynesian macro-economic management was
generally accepted in Western countries.
PLANNING BY GOVERNMENT & BY MARKET 1
In the views of economist, it is more often to classify “planning” according
to the decision makers. Therefore, planning can indeed be categorized into
“planning by government” and “planning by market”. The two competing
paradigms of zoning was understood as a kind of government regulatory
measure, in terms of economic theorization the Pigovian developed on the
basis of the book named The Economics of Welfare written by Professor
Arthur C Pigou (Pigou, 1920), which was first published in 1920. On the one
hand, and the Coasian paradigm developed mainly on the basis of Ronald
Coase’s Nobel Prize paper “The Problem of Social Cost” of 1960. In terms
of economic efficiency in the planning arena, the Pigovian paradigm is one
for government intervention whereas the Coasian paradigm is against it (Lai,
1994). In the British literature, the equivalent of the Pigovian and Coasian
debate is the discussion within the planning profession about the
1 The information of this section is mainly based on Lai, L. W.-c. 1994. "The economics
of land-use zoning: A literature review and d analysis of the work of coase". Town
Planning Review 65: 77-99. and ________. 1997a. "Property rights justification for
planning and a theory of zoning". Progress in Planning 48: 161-246.
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conventional dichotomy of “plan” versus “market”, “planning” versus “price
mechanism”.
Pigovian Paradigm
The Pigovian paradigm refers to the expression of the concept of “external
effects” which is a ground for the support for government intervention. In
modern welfare economics, an externality is a kind of market failure which
can be divided into positive externalities and negative externalities. In the
former case, it arises where the cost suffered by a party due to the activities
of another is uncompensated. Conversely, in the latter case, the externality
refers to the benefits produced by one party are enjoyed by another without
compensation. Pollution is a typically described as an example of negative
externalities according to Pigou. Those uncompensated costs or benefits
would create economic inefficiency. The Pigovian economists advocates the
belief that the market only responds to private costs and benefits, and such
behaviour lead to the failure of equating marginal value and marginal social
costs, and hence failure of Pareto economic efficiency. Therefore, they agree
that the ways in tackling this problem is the intervention by government or
state regulation of the land market. (Pigou, 1920)
11
Not only “externalities” is being concerned by the Pigou’s advocates, but
also the existence of “public goods”. According to Lai (1997a), public goods
are the goods or services which the free market is believed to be naturally
disinterested in providing an adequate amount, if any at all. The reason
behind this is the public good is non-excludable, in other words, it is jointly
consumed. The consumption of the good by one individual does not reduce
the amount of the good available for consumption by others and hence no
one can be effectively excluded from using that good. The marginal cost of
serving one more consumer is zero, and for efficient resource allocation, the
seller is required to set zero pricing which deter the private sector. Moreover,
the consumers would have a tendency to deny their real demand, hoping that
they could be the free rider without payment. Classic examples given by Lai
are national defence and education. Without the government involvement,
individual citizens tend to deny their needs of these services when they are
asked for the concerned expenditure in the expectation that someone else
would pay for them. In the argument concerning the public goods,
government planning is thus further supported since the government could
supply what the market is believed to be unable or unwilling to produce at a
price which appeared to be zero in the views of citizens, but indeed the cost
is borne by the tax payers.
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Lastly, the problem of “monopoly”, the sole supplier of a good or service,
leads to the intervention of government planning. The unregulated
monopolies, like externality, are said to incur economic inefficiency for
failing to equate marginal valuation with marginal cost. The standard
solutions to correct such inefficient outcomes include a tax on the
monopoly’s “abnormal profit”; minimum output quota; maximum price
control; and breaking up the monopoly by anti-trust legislation with a view
to reintroducing competition into the market.
To conclude, the problems concerning externality, public goods and
monopoly are the major arguments made by Pigovian economists for
supporting the intervention of government intervention in the market.
Coasian Paradigm
The Pigovian welfare economics arguments, however, was challenged by
Ronald Coase. Concerning the externalities, he wrote a paper named “The
Problem of Social Cost”. In this paper, he firstly gave rise of his popular
theorem, the Coase theorem. He believed that if property rights are clearly
determined and if all costs of transactions are zero, then resource use will be
the same regardless of who owns the property rights. This theorem implies
13
that Pigovian interventionist measures are unnecessary because the market
can tackle externalities if transaction costs are zero by internalizing the
uncompensated costs or benefits. It is because the involved parties who are
in conflict of interests would negotiate among themselves and reach an
agreement finally by means of trading their rights. This would lead to the
same resource allocation regardless of who owns the property rights. (Coase,
1960)
The Coase theorem is different from the Pigovian model where one party is
assumed blameworthy. According to Lai (1997a), the general idea of the
matter of Coase is “a balance of conflicting interests which depends on the
cost-benefit comparison of the activities of the parties involved rather than
an arbitrary and a priori condemnation of any of the parties.” Avoiding
harm on one party indeed would incur harm on another party. Even though
social costs are created by many activities, they also generate social benefits
meanwhile. Hence, when tacking the externality problem, it would be at the
expense and also the benefit aspects. It was also pointed out both direct
benefits to the parties involved in the production and indirect benefits to the
innocent third party would be involved in the externality production. It is rare
that the innocent third party suffering directly from the externalities received
zero indirect benefit in the real world.
14
Concerning the “public goods”, Coase used a historical case of lighthouse to
illustrate that the private sector could produce profitable public goods by
using direct pricing to fund public facilities. He discovered that a private
lighthouse business did in fact exist as early as the reign of the Quarts by
conducting a historical survey of the financing of lighthouses in England and
Wales. Private parties built, operated, financed and owned the lighthouses.
They could sell the lighthouse or dispose of it by bequest. The toll varied
with the lighthouse and ships paid a toll, varying with the size of the vessel,
for each lighthouse passed. The specialized toll collecting agents and the
constraints that vessels ultimately needed to berth at a port solved the
metering and free-riding problems in the case of the lighthouse. Coase
pointed out that the economists’ common belief regarding the impossibility
of securing payment was due to their habit of armchair speculation untested
by empirical facts. This illustration although was simple historical case study,
it gave a general transaction cost view of public goods i.e. they are goods for
which direct pricing is not viable due to high transaction costs. (Lai, 1997a)
Finally, the notion of property right suggested by Coase gave critique on
government intervention against monopoly. Firstly, being the monopoly is
the only existing firm, it still has to deal with the potential competition which
would encourage it promote innovation to reduce cost. Secondly, the
15
“abnormal profit” gained by the monopoly is regarded as a pay back to its
past investment for being the survivor of market competition after the
elimination of weaker firms. Therefore, this so-called “profits” are actually
normal returns for efforts which win the consumers over rather than
unexpected return.
The assumption of Coase Theorem, however, has been criticized for being
highly unrealistic in the real world. Furthermore, it is argued to be
tautological since under the assumption of zero transaction costs and
perfect information, entry and exit will definitely be costless and complete
competition and efficient resource allocation must be resulted. In response
to the above criticism, Professor Lawrence Lai explained that the more
significant point is the corollary of the invariant version of Coase Theorem,
“where transaction costs are positive, resource allocation would be
affected by the ways in which rights and liabilities are assigned”. (Lai,
1997a)
The Government can influence the resource allocation through assigning and
reassigning the rights and liabilities. In other words, it implied that policy is
not inevitably redundant and the Government has a positive role in
16
delineating property rights. The two aspects of thinking of Coase are
comparative costs approach and delineation of property rights.
Comparative Costs Approach
Indeed, Coase had not neglected the existence of transaction cost in the real
world. According to Lai (1997a), Coase stated that the market incurs
transaction costs in his paper “The nature of the firm”, and the existence of
transaction cost is the reason of the emergence of firms in the market so as
to reduce such costs. Government can also be treated as an example of firm
which aims to tackle transaction costs. The major question is whether the
cost incurred by the Government intervention would be greater or smaller
than the alternative of leaving it to the market without regulation.
Comparison of the opportunity cost of different institutional arrangements is
thus essential.
Delineation of Property Rights
It is concluded by Coase that the delimitation of property rights is a
prerequisite to market transaction. In term of the field of planning, Coase
found that zoning as government regulation may be acceptable if the
transaction costs of using the unregulated land market become excessive.
17
There are also two broader concepts of zoning according to Lai (1997a).
Firstly, zoning is a pure forward planning without any development control
so that change in use or transfer of rights can be costless and left to the
market. Secondly, it is predicted that all types of land rights contain one
common attribute i.e. the exclusive right in the use of land. This right to
exclude others in fact is in relation to the concept of boundary delineation.
REASONS OF PLANNING FAILURE2
As indicated by Hall (1980), the planning disasters refer to “any planning
process that is perceived by many people to have gone wrong”, and they
could be divided into positive and negative disasters. The former ones are
“the decisions to take a course of action, with a physical result, that were
implemented despite much criticism and even opposition, and which were
later felt by many informed people to have been a mistake” while the later
ones are “decisions to take a course of action, culminating in a physical
result, that were later substantially modified or reversed or abandoned after
considerable commitment of effort and resources”. (Hall, 1980) Three kinds
of planning uncertainty were distinguished in the work of Friend and Jessop
(Friend and Jessop, 1969). They are the uncertainty about the relevant
2 The information in this section is based on Hall, P. G. 1980. Great planning disasters.
London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
18
planning environment, decisions in related decision areas and value
judgement.
Uncertainty on Relevant Planning Environment
They refer to everything outside the immediate decision-making system. It is
not easy for planners to predict the mass behaviour of people in society,
whether the particular subject is their propensity to have children, to move
about, or to demand different goods and services. The failures consist
essentially of bad forecasts, invariably of a quantitative kind of the system
that is being planned, or planned for. And most prove to be of two kinds:
first, bad forecasts of demand; secondly, bad cost forecasts. Poor demand
forecasts are a problem because they directly affect the evaluation of the
project in terms of its rate of return, whether this evaluation is made in
conventional finance-accounting terms or in terms of some social cost-
benefit framework.
Uncertainty on Decisions in Related Decision Areas
It includes decisions that are within the decision-making system but relate to
areas of discretion beyond the immediate problem. This is much more
specific and small-scale than the first kind of uncertainty. It deals with the
behaviour of other individual decision makers, or these same decision-
19
makers in groups or organization. They may be in other organizations, or in
other parts of the same organization. The important point is that they have
some area of discretion outside the area of our decision-makers, which
makes them to some degree independent agents; therefore our decision-
makers have to take regard of their actions.
Uncertainty on Value Judgments
It includes all the problems where information has been assembled, but
where the final decision turns upon questions of value. In the democratic
cities, it consists of the problem of gauging the values of the client
population and trying to forecast how these many change over time.
Consequently, it leads the problem of how to compare value weightings on
different dimensions among different groups, in situations where the values
are in conflict.
CONTENERISATION 3
The concept of containerization is developed because of the advantages to
be gained from a through transport system. From beginnings in the United
3 The information in this section is based on the Levinson, M. 2006. The box: How the
shipping container made the world smaller and the world economy bigger: Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press. and Burg, G. V. 1975. Containerisation and other unit
transport. Edited by London: Hutchinson Benham.
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States, it is now generally accepted in the developed countries of the world
that a standardised method of transportation of cargo across the oceans can
offer definite economic gains. (Burg, 1975) The concept of marine freight
containers dates back to the mid-1950s when a Scottish American trucking
company executive, Malcom McLean, saved loading time by taking the
body from a tractor-trailer and placing it fully loaded on a ship.
“On 26 April 1956, a crane lifted fifty-eight, kialuminium truck bodies
abroad an aging tanker ship moored in Newark, New Jersey. Five days later,
the Ideal-X sailed into Houston, where fifty-eight trucks waited to take on
the metal boxes and haul them to their destinations. This was the beginning
of a revolution” (Levinson, 2006)
The first such conversion, in 1956, was a modified Pan-Atlantic tanker, the
Ideal X, which sailed from New Jersey to Texas with 58 35-foor containers
on board. It was realized that before the concept of containerization was
engaged, transporting goods was very expensive. The value of a container is
how it is used. The container made shipping less costly and less complicated
due to the usage of highly automated system for moving goods. Although
containerization destroyed an old economy with ill-paid and ill-treated
workers who made their livings by loading and unloading ships, it helped
build a new one. A large number of new ports were built in placed with no
21
ports before like Felixstowe in England and Tanjung Pelepas in Malaysia.
Small towns, which are distant from the population centre and a port, could
take advantage of their cheap land and labour to entice factories so as to
enjoy cheap transportation. Poor countries could become the suppliers of
wealthy countries far away for their economic development. The industrial
sectors in Hong Kong was at advantage also since the cost of bringing raw
materials in and sending finished goods out had decreased drastically.(Erie,
2004)
This new economy encouraged domestic companies to become international
ones. They had no choice to avoid the global competition because the global
market is coming to them. Multinational manufacturers were likely to
transform into international manufacturers by integrating isolated factories
into network so that the cheapest location in particular item production could
be chosen. In 1956, the world was full of small manufacturers selling locally,
but at the end of the twentieth century, pure local markets for good were few
and far apart from one another.
Workers
Marine transport of cargo had been a labour intensive industry for many
years, whereas it ought to have been an industry relying far more on
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mechanical appliances to move essentially heavy and bulky packages. In the
early 1950s, before container shipping was even a concept, most of the
world’s great centres of commerce had docks at their heart. Millions of
people were employed to drive, drag, or push cargo through city streets to or
form the piers in the freight transportation industry. Warehouses and
factories were located at the heads of many of the wharves for easier
delivery of raw materials and faster shipment of finished goods. In San
Francisco or Montreal, Hamburg or London, Rio or Buenos Aires, the
surrounding neighbourhoods were filled with households that made their
livings from the port.
Using ships to move goods was very complicated in the 1950s though it had
been practised for thousands of years. At the shipper’s factory or warehouse,
the freight would be loaded piece by piece on a truck or railcar. Hundreds or
thousand of such items would be delivered to the waterfront using the truck
or train. Each item had to be unloaded separately, recorded on a tally sheet,
and carried to storage in a warehouse stretching alongside the dock. Loading
and unloading the goods was the job of the longshoremen. The work could
be brutally physical. They moved hunks of metal across the dock, from the
incoming ship to a lighter, or barge which would transport them to plants.
Limited automation had arrived during World War II (1939-1945). However,
even with machinery at hand, the ultimate solution was still using muscle.
23
Labours might work in daylight or at night, in all weather conditions and
their jobs contained the risk of tripping over a load of pipe or being knocked
down by a draft on the hook. Forty seven dockworkers were killed on the
job between 1947 and 1957 in Marseilles, while in Manchester, where
dockers serviced ocean-going vessels that ascended a canal from the Irish
Sea, one out of two longshoremen suffered an injury in 1950, and one out of
six landed in the hospital. New York reported 2,208 serious accidents in
1950, which was a relatively lower injury rate. It was unpleasant and often
dangerous job for the longshoremen working on the dock with an injury rate
three times of construction work and eight times that in manufacturing.
(Pacini and Pons, 1996)
Despite of the low wage and risks borne, sociologists found that few of the
dock workers wanted to quit the job. Longshoremen often spent their entire
lives near the waterfront. Also, it was observed appears such waterfront jobs
belonged to particular working class communities more than in any other
industry in a big city. In London and Liverpool, the Irish ruled the docks,
hence non-white immigrants from the West Indies or Africa could not find
any employment (Rubin, 1974). In the American South, where about three
quarters of all longshoremen were black, and white and black dockworkers
were belong to separate union locals and often worked separate ships.
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(Kelley, 1993) Generally speaking, strangers, including men of different
ethnic groups, were unwelcome in the dock work.
Harsh working conditions, economic uncertainty, and the insularity of
docker life gave rise to unique mores. Dockworkers saw themselves as
tough and independent men doing a very tough job. They presented
themselves as rough-and-ready individuals and that self-image was also the
public’s image. A British survey published in 1950 placed dockers twenty-
ninth among thirty professions in status at a time when dockers earned more
than the average national wage. (Hall and Jones, 1950) Longshoreman at
that time belonged to a global fraternity of mean with a common outlook on
life and a common sense of exclusion from the mainstream.
After the global trade had been stimulated by containerization, the living
standard of workers boosted not only due to the ready availability of
inexpensive imported consumer goods, but also improvements in wages and
benefits. Government provided stronger safety nets, the workweek grew
shorter, disability pay was made more generous, and the retirement at sixty
or sixty-two was normal. All in all, the container helped bring advantages to
workers.
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Reshaping the Maritime Business
The US economy bloomed in the years just after World War II but the
maritime industry did not. It was warned by a California State Senate
committee in 1951 that unless the cargo handling costs could be reduced,
there as little hope for coastwise revival. Although the larger American ship
lines were not particularly profitable, they were relatively sheltered.
Competition in this industry where almost all ship lines belonged to cartels.
Reshaping the business of shipping was then left to an outsider with no
maritime experience whatsoever, a self-made trucking magnate named
Malcom McLean. (Fitzgerald, 1986) McLean was born in 1913 near the tiny
town of Maxton, deep in the swamp country of south-eastern North Carolina.
Maxton, once called Shoe Heel, had been populated by Scottish Highlanders
in the late eighteenth century.
By 1935, twenty-two-years-old McLean owned 2 trucks and 1 tractor trailer,
employed nine drivers who owned their own rigs, and had already hauled
steel drums from North Carolina to New Jersey and cotton yarn mills in
New England with just one year of experience as a trucker. By 1940, six-
year-old McLean Trucking owned 30 trucks and grossed $230,000. McLean
built his operations during the war, gaining additional routes. At the war’s
end in 1945, Malcom McLean controlled a thriving business with 162 trucks,
mainly hauling textiles and cigarettes from North Carolina to Philadelphia,
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New York, and southern New England. Revenues in 1946 were $2.2 million,
nearly ten times the level of 1940. McLean, already wealthy at age thirty-
four, viewed this as just a beginning. (Levinson, 2006) An obsessive focus
on cutting costs was the key to the success McLean Trucking. Moreover, the
cost-saving innovations continually materialized as McLean Trucking grew
as a dynamic company in a very stodgy industry. By 1954, it had become
one of the largest trucking companies in American, ranking eighth in
revenue and third among all truck lines in after-tax profit. (Levinson, 2006)
The concept that became container shipping was Malcom McLean’s.
McLean, impatient to build a business, demanded that his staff find a way to
turn his concept into reality. In March, a call to Keith Tantlinger was placed
as McLean wanted Tantlinger’s expertise immediately. Tantlinger, aged
thirty-five, was a chief engineer at Brown Industries in Spokane,
Washington, had already built a reputation as a container expert. Brown had
been building truck trailers since 1932, and Tantlinger’s job, along with
designing trailers for trucking companies, involved speaking at industry
meetings to promote Brown’s products. In 1949, he had designed the first
modern shipping container, a 30-foot aluminium box that could be stacked
two high on barges or placed on a chassis and pulled by a truck. However,
despite much curiosity, this modern-designed container was not appreciated
in the industry except McLean. (Levinson, 2006)
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In the meeting with Tantlinger, McLean proposed to use containers thirty-
three feet long, a length chosen because the available deck space aboard the
T-2 tankers was divisible by thirty-three. These boxes were at least seven
times the size of any containers then in the common use. He proposed to
install metal frames, called flying decks or spar-decks, above the tangle of
pipes that covered the decks of his two tankers. The spar-decks would hold
the containers eight abreast. The idea was to attach six steel pieces, each a
foot long with a small hole at the bottom, to the sides of each container.
When the container was loaded on board ship, the steel pieces would slide
vertically through slots in the frame of the spar-deck, and a rod would be
inserted through the holes, underneath the frame, to lock the container in
place. Most importantly, the containers Pan-Atlantic planned to use would
be designed to be shifted easily among ships, trucks, and trains. (Levinson,
2006; Tantlinger, 1982)
Tantlinger quickly saw that the system was unworkable: the containers were
meant to be locked in placed with steel pieces protruding beneath them,
making them impossible to stack, and the A-shaped brackets made the
trailers too wide and too tall for the highways. Tantlinger told McLean that
standard Brown containers, which used the aluminium sides and roof to bear
most of the load, would do the job. The McLean group was trying,
unsuccessfully, to disprove his claim. Sold on the merits of Brown’s
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containers, McLean ordered two hundred boxes and demanded that the
reluctant Tantlinger move to be his chief engineer.
Part of Tantlinger’s job was to convince the American Bureau of Shipping,
which sets standards for maritime insurers, that the Ideal-X would be
seaworthy when loaded with containers. After negotiation, the Coast Guard
agreed to a test. McLean asked trucking company workers to load two
containers with cardboard boxes filled with coke briquets, a cargo of
average density and negligible cost. The boxes were lashed to the spardeck
of the converted T-2s. The ship then sailed back and forth between Newark
and Houston, the Coast Guard checking the load after each voyage, until a
trip the heavy seas persuaded that maritime agency that loaded containers
were safe. They finally got the Bureau of Shipping’s approval.
For the matter of loading, most cargo ships in the 1950s had winches
allowing them to load and unload in any port, but a standard shipboard
winch could not shift a twenty-ton container without destabilizing the ship.
Two huge revolving cranes at a disused shipyard in Chester, Pennsylvania
had been taken for the solution. McLean dismantled the cranes which
contained booms seventy-two feet above the dock. He cut twenty feet out of
their structures, and shipped them off to Newark and Houston. Port workers
at both locations reinforced the piers to accommodate the added weight and
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installed the rails and large power supplies the cranes required. Hanging
from the cranes was another moneysaving piece of equipment newly
invented by Tantlinger, a spreader bar stretching the entire length and width
of a container. It was necessary for longshoremen to climb ladders to the
roof of each container and attach hooks dangling from the crane by using the
spreader. Instead, the crane operator could lower the spreader over a
container and engage the hooks at each corner with the flip of a switch.
Once the box had been lifted and moved, another flip of the switch would
disengage the hooks, without a worker on the ground touching the container.
(Levinson, 2006)
McLean wanted to start new service in 1955. Not until late 1955, after
months of hearings, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) overruled
objections from the railroads and authorised McLean to carry containers
between Newark and Houston. On April 26, 1956, one hundred dignitaries
enjoyed lunch at Port Newark and watched the crane place a container on
the Ideal-X every seven minutes. The ship was loaded in less than eight
hours and set sail the same day. The cost of loading also decreased. Loading
loose cargo on a medium-size cargo ship cost $5.83 per ton in 1956 while
McLean’s experts pegged the cost of loading the Ideal-X at $0.158 per ton.
(Bonnot, 1956) The container seemed to have a future. Later, McLean’s
engineers figured out that through the addition of small deck extensions, the
30
tankers’ capacity could be increased from 58 containers to 60 and then 62.
(Levinson, 2006)
However, the railroad and trucking industries worked against McLean’s
invention. They protested vehemently that McLean’s takeover of Waterman
without ICC approval was a blatant violation of the Interstate Commerce
Act. In November 1956, an ICC examiner agreed that although Malcom
McLean was a man of vision, determination and considerable executive
talent, his purchase of Waterman without commission approval broke the
law. As punishment, McLean Industries was suggested to be forced to divest
Waterman. Fortunately, the ICC rejected the examiner’s recommendation in
1957.
Malcom McLean was definitely the “inventor” of the shipping container
although metal cargo boxes of various shapes and sizes had been used for
decades, and numerous reports and studies supported the idea of
containerised freight before the Ideal-X set sail. The transformational nature
of McLean’s accomplishment had to be appreciated. Containers designed by
Malcom McLean differed from those early containers since they
fundamentally altered the economics of shipping and had no wider
consequences.
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The fundamental insight of Malcom McLean was that the shipping
industry’s business was moving cargo, not sailing ships which was
commonplace today but quite radical in the 1950s. That led him to a concept
of containerization quite different from anything that had come before. To
reduce the cost of shipping goods, McLean understood that not just a metal
box was required but an entire new way of handling freight i.e. changing
every part of the system including ports, ships, cranes, storage facilities,
trucks, trains, and the operations of the shippers. In that understanding, he
was years ahead of almost everyone else in the transportation industry in the
1950s. (Levinson, 2006)
Standardization of Containers
Late 1950s: Diversity of containers
By the late 1950s, the concept of “containers” was being considered in the
transportation world. But “container” meant very different things to different
people. In Europe, the container was usually a wooden crate with steel
reinforcements with a height of 4 or 5 feet and they were designed for being
shifted by cranes with hooks, and others had slots beneath the floor so they
could be moved by forklifts. In New York, one manufacturer named Marine
Steel Corporation advertised more than 30 different models. According to a
survey conducted in the United States in 1959, out of the 58,000 privately
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owned shipping containers, 43,000 of them were 8 feet square or less at the
base, while a mere 15,000, which were mainly owned by Sea-Land and
Matson, were more than 8 feet long. (Levinson, 2006)
This diversity of containers threatened the development of containerization.
Ones could imagine that if one transportation company’s containers would
not fit on another’s ships or railcars, each company would need a vast fleet
of containers exclusively for its own customers. Due to the absence of
standardization of containers, the European railroad container could not
cross the Atlantic since trucks and railroads in U.S. were not designed to
handle European sizes, and the systems used by various American railroads
were incompatible with the European containers. It meant that a container
on the New York Central could not readily be transferred to the Missouri
Pacific. Therefore, regardless how small the scale of the business or
infrequent the ships’ visits, each ship line had its own dock and cranes in
every port, because other companies’ equipment were not able to handle its
boxes.
Marad’s decision on container standardization
In 1958, the United States Maritime Administration (Marad) decided to end
this anarchistic situation. Marad was an obscure government agency, but it
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had enormous power over the maritime industry. With its a sister agency,
the Federal Maritime Board, they distributed subsidies to build ships,
administered laws dictating that government freight should travel in U.S.-
flag vessels, gave operating subsidies to U.S. ships on international routes,
and enforced the Jones Act 4. The variation of containers increased Marad’s
financial risk. In case a ship line, which was subsidized by Marad, built a
vessel to carry its unique containers, but then ran into financial problems,
Marad might end up to foreclose on a ship that nobody was willing to buy.
Setting common standards was not only Marad’s desire, it was also
supported by the navy, which had the right to commandeer subsidized ships
in the event of war and worried that a merchant fleet using incompatible
container systems would complicate logistics. In June 1958, Marad named
two committees of experts, one to recommend standards for container sizes
and the other to study container construction. (Levinson, 2006)
The gauges in railway industry, for example, had gone through a
standardization process but there were two other important differences
between standardizing rail gauges and containers. One was the scope since
the width of a railroad track affected only railroads, while the design of
containers affected the ship lines, railroads, truck lines, and even shippers
4 Jones Act is the venerable law dictating that only American-built ships, using American
crews and owned by American companies, could carry cargo between U.S. ports.
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who owned their own equipment. The other difference was the history.
Railroads had been established for several decades before it was found that
incompatible track gauges was a major problem. Container shipping was, on
the other hand, brand-new thus it pushed standardization before the industry
developed. This might lock everyone into designs that would later prove
undesirable. (Farrell and Saloner, 1986; Katz and Shapiro, 1994)
Hence, from an economic perspective, it was reasonable to wonder the
desirability of the standardization process that began in 1958. If government
agencies in that period had conducted cost-benefit studies as practice, the
entire process of container standardization was likely not to be proceeded.
Controversy arose almost at once as the abovementioned concerns were not
presented in the first meeting held by Marad’s two expert committees on
successive days in November 1958. Also, both Pan-Atlantic and Matson, the
only two companies actually operating containerships, were not invited to
participate into the process of setting standards for the industry that they
were creating in 1958, as their industry constructions were not subsidized by
the government.
After much debate, a “family” of acceptable container sizes, not just a single
size, was defined under the agreement of the, although some European
railroads could not carry loads wider than 7 feet. It was explained by the
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committee that the decision have to be guided mainly by domestic
requirements, with the hope that foreign practice would gradually conform
to their standards. For container heights, the committee finally agreed that
containers should be no more than 8 1/2 feet high but could be less5. Length
was a tough to design because the diversity of containers in use or on order
presented a serious operational problem. The short container although could
be stacked atop a longer one, its weight could not rest on the longer one’s
load-bearing steel corner posts. To support a shorter container above, the
bottom container would require either steel posts along its sides or thick,
load-bearing walls. More posts or thicker walls would increase weight and
reduce interior space and render the container more costly to use. The length
question then was deferred. (Levinson, 2006)
The other Marad committee on the contrary defined the most important task
of container construction as establishing maximum weights for loaded
containers, because weight limits would determine the lifting power required
for cranes and the load that the bottom container in a stack might have to
bear. The weight of empty containers, however, would not affect cranes,
ships, or trucks, and the committee decided not to address it. Various other
5 Some maritime industry representatives favoured containers 8 feet tall while trucking
industry officials, who were observers without a vote, argued that 8 1/2-foot-tall boxes
would let customers squeeze more cargo into each container and allow room for forklifts
to work inside.
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complicated issues, such as the strength of corner posts, the design of doors,
and the standardization of corner fittings for lifting by cranes, were not
considered. (Levinson, 2006)
Emergence of ASA
The American Standards Association (ASA) was the competitor of the
committee appointed by Marad. The association was supported by private
industry and in the business of setting standards, dealing with issues as
extensive as the size of screw threads and the construction of plaster walls.
The work was vital but also monotonous. Engineers on a typical American
Standards association committee would study technical reports, hear the
views and interests of the firms concerned, and eventually recommend
standards that individual companies could follow if they wished. To deal
with containers, the association created Materials Handling Sectional
Committee 5 (MH-5) in July 1958. MH-5, organized itself into
subcommittees, were instructed to develop specifications that would permit
optimum interchange among carriers and also be compatible with domestic
pallet containers and cargo containers, and foreign carriers. (Levinson, 2006)
The MH-5 committee argued that the maritime industry alone should not be
making decisions about standardization and the process should involve other
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affected industries, and should include foreign organizations so that the
standards might eventually apply globally. Therefore they asked the Marad
committees to withdraw from the scene, but the Marad committees refused
and carried on over the winter of 1959, debating maximum weights, lifting
methods, and the pros and cons of requiring steel posts every eight feet
along container walls rather than just at the corners. Meanwhile the MH-5
subcommittees went to work on the same issues. The MH-5 subcommittee
on dimensions quickly reached a consensus that all pairs of lengths in use or
about to be used i.e. 12 and 24 feet, 17 and 35 feet, 20 and 40 feet would be
considered “standard”. Only a proposal to endorse 10-foot containers was
rejected by the subcommittee, because they were too small to be efficient.
(Levinson, 2006)
The trailer manufacturers, truck lines, and railroads dominated the decision
of MH-5. They preferred to reach a decision on container sizes quickly
because the domestic use of containers was expected to grow once standard
dimensions were approved. Also, within the limits suggested MH-5
subcommittee, trucks and railroads could accommodate almost any length
and weight. On the other hand, some lines worried that if their containers
were deemed “non-standard”, the large investments could be rendered
worthless. Bull Line begged to be left alone to continue to carry containers
15 feet long and 6 feet 10 inches high on its break-bulk ships because it was
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willing to interchange containers with other companies. The government
was urged by other lines to let the market sort things out as the container
industry matured. The Marad committee on dimensions split when it
reviewed of “standard” lengths that the MH-5 subcommittee’s six proposed
in April 1959. Marad gave the deciding vote in favour of the MH-5
standards since it was in a hurry to get standards into place. (Levinson, 2006)
Emergence of National Defence Transportation Association
Meanwhile, yet another player entered the standards business. The National
Defence Transportation Association, representing the companies that
handled military cargo, decided to study container dimensions too. The
effort’s chief proponent was an aggressive entrepreneur named Morris
Forgash. A consensus was reached quickly under the pressure imposed by
Forgash. By late summer of 1959, it had agreed unanimously that “standard”
containers would be 20 feet or 40 feet long, 8 feet wide, and 8 feet high.
(Ruppenthal, 1960)
The MIT-5 subcommittee and the Marad dimensions committee adopted one
set of “standard” sizes, while the National Defence Transportation
Association approved another, therefore the wheeling and dealing started at
the ASA. It was the ASA’s normal procedures, to designate six “standard”
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sizes by using mail ballot among all participating organizations. Yet, the
vote never occurred and insiders set to work to change the recommendations.
A task force of the dimensions subcommittee convened on 16 September
1959, and its chairman, Ogden, announced to revisit the question of
container length since almost all states had permitted 40-foot trailers and the
length limit that had justified 35-foot boxes no longer existed. Also, eight
states had increased their length limits to permit trucks to pull two trailers of
27 feet each in the West. Ogden thus urged the committee to approve 27-
foot containers as a regional standard size for the West, to reduce costs for
trucking companies. (Levinson, 2006)
Emergence of Mr. Hall
Mr. Herbert hall, the chair of the entire MH-5 process and was a retired
engineer at Aluminium Company of America, intervened in the
standardization process. Despite of the fact that he knew little about the
economics of using containers, he was fascinated by the concept of an
arithmetic relationship among sizes. He believed flexibility could be created
by making containers in 10-, 20-, 30-, and 40-foot lengths. However, his
suggestion was not agreed by railroads and ship lines, because loading a
train or ship with four 10-foot containers would cost four times as much as
loading a single 40-foot containers. The 10-, 20-, and 40-foot lengths Hall
40
favoured were promptly approved, while the other lengths were deleted from
the list of “standard” sizes because the ASA’s Standards Review Board
would not accept the 12-foot, 17-foot, 24-foot, and 35-foot containers that
the MH-5 subcommittee had endorsed. Hall’s recommendations, together
with the proposed 27-foot standard for the West and several standards for
container construction, were sent to member organizations for a vote late in
1959. (Levinson, 2006)
Nevertheless, no ships or containers then in use or in design would fit into
the container system recommended by Hall. If Pan-Atlantic and Matson
agreed to use only 10-foot, 20-foot, and 40-foot containers, tens of millions
of dollars of investment would be written off. Also, they were not willing to
shift to container sizes that they deemed inefficient for their own purposes.
Nevertheless, Pan-Atlantic and Matson would give up eligibility for
government ship-construction subsidies if they declined to adopt the
standards, while their competitors would be able to build “standard”
containerships partially at government expense. The proposed 27-foot
regional standard was defeated in the voting among individual companies,
but the recommendation for Hall’s “modular” lengths met with large
numbers of abstentions. The confusion led Hall to decide to organize a
revote. This time, there was no ballot but only a single question on the
suitability for the association to establish standard nominal dimensions 8
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feet wide, 8 feet high, and 10, 20, 30, and 40 feet long. Hall, as the chairman,
decided that the 10-foot multiples had won sufficient support. 10-, 20-, 30-,
and 40-foot boxes were declared to be the only standard containers on 14
April 1961. The Federal Maritime Board promptly announced that only
containerships designed for those sizes could receive construction subsidies.
(Levinson, 2006)
Emergence of ISO
At American urging, the International Standards Organization (ISO) agreed
to study containers. The ISO project aimed to establish worldwide
guidelines before large financial commitments were made by firms.
Delegates from eleven countries, and observers from fifteen more, came to
New York in September 1961 to start the process. Most were appointed by
their governments, except for the United States which was represented by
the ASA. The United States was the chair of the meeting. It was the practise
of ISO to decide how a product must perform rather than how it should be
made wherever possible which meant that ISO Technical Committee 104
(TC104) would focus on making containers easily interchangeable, not on
the details of construction. Prolonged debate between proponents of steel
containers in Europe and aluminium containers in America could be avoided.
No standard would dictate aluminium or steel. Three working groups were
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set up and a slow-moving process began. The ASA’s MH-5 subcommittees
continued work on other domestic standards, with the hope that whatever
they agreed would later be accepted by ISO while many leading U.S.
transport engineers were involved simultaneously in both groups. (Levinson,
2006)
The endless discussion over container sizes had consumed three years in the
United States and it was repeated at the international level. In 1964, smaller
containers including the European railroad sizes and American 5-foot and 6
2/3- foot boxes along with 10-, 20-, 30-, and 40-foot containers were
formally adopted as ISO standards. Containers owned by the two leading
container-ship operators, Sea-Land Service (the former Pan-Atlantic) and
Matson, could not be conformed to the new “standard” dimensions. While
one set of ISO subcommittees and task forces was determining dimensions,
other groups of experts were seeking common ground concerning strength
requirements and lifting standards. (Levinson, 2006)
Problems of lifting and locking devices
The problem came with the lifting and locking devices that fit into the holes.
Since one simple locking system would not work for all, complicated
systems of chains and locks were necessary for railroads that carried the
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containers of various ship lines to secure all of the different containers.
Therefore, it was crucial to have agreement on a standard corner fitting for
making containers readily interchangeable. Facing the obstacle by every
company which had financial reasons to favour its own fitting, an MH-5 task
force had tried, and failed, to come up with a new design compatible with all
existing corner fittings in 1961. Containerships were hugely capital-inten-
sive and the industry’s viability depended upon minimizing port time and
maximizing the time. Special concern about “gathering” was paid by the
ship lines.
Modified version of the Sea-Land fitting as U.S. standard
Finally, with the suggestion by Fred Muller, an engineer serving as the MH-
5 committee’s secretary, Sea-Land released its patent rights on 29 January
1963, so that the MH-5 committee could use them as the basis for a standard
corner fitting and twist lock. Although the Americans promoted the Sea-
Land fitting as the basis for a potential international standard, four of the
leading steamship lines, Sea-Land, Matson, Alaska Steamship, and
American President Lines fought back. It was because they would be
required to change all of their containers. Hence, they proposed a minor
change to the fitting that the MH-5 committee was designing based on the
Sea-Land patent. Marad urged ship lines to accept whatever MH-5 agreed
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upon. Finally, the American Standards Association’s Standards Review
Board approved a modified version of the Sea-Land fitting as the U.S.
standard on 16 September 1965, and ignored the fact that the specialists on
its MH-5 committee were still debating the finer details of corner fittings.
(Levinson, 2006)
American design as international standard for corner fittings
In the meeting of the ISO container committee in The Hague on 19
September 1965, the United States presented the modified Sea-Land corner
fitting as the new U.S. standard, and the National Castings fitting was put
forth as the British standard. The British quickly agreed that the American
favourite was superior. Although ISO rules required that the documents
supporting proposed standards had to be distributed four months in advance
of a meeting, the MH-5 committee had made its recommendation only a few
days earlier, and no technical documents were ready. The ISO committee
voted unanimously to waive the four-month rule.
The new era of freight transportation finally seemed to have arrived, when
the ISO delegates approved the American design as the international
standard for corner fittings on 24 September 1965. In principle, land and sea
carriers would soon be able to handle one another’s containers. Container-
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handling hardware could then be designed with more certainty, and an
increasing number of products designed to load and carry containers would
be marketed. (Levinson, 2006)
Shortcomings of the approval
The corner fitting was approved by the ISO container committee without
defining all of the loads and stresses it should be able to withstand. Starting
in the autumn of 1965, fittings which are based on the design that had
worked for Sea-Land’s operations had been ordered by ship lines and
leasing companies, but they had never been tested under other conditions.
The maximum container weights had not yet been set by the ISO committee.
In Europe, the coupling systems of railroads were different from those in the
United States, and the Sea-Land fittings and locks had never been subjected
to such conditions.
The approved new fittings were tested by the engineers around the world
through 1966, and a variety of shortcomings had been realized. Also, the
containers failed in the emergency tests carried in Detroit. The
uncomfortable fact was that the corner fittings which had been approved in
1965 were deficient. Nine engineers were told to solve the problems quickly.
It was calculated by them that thicker steel was required for the walls of
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each fitting to solve most of the problems. No existing container complied
with their “ad hoc” design. In June 1967, ISO approved the “ad hoc” design
at a meeting in Moscow. New fittings were required to be welded into the
thousands of boxes that had been built with the ISO-approved corner fittings
in 1965. It had cost millions of dollars. (Levinson, 2006)
Cooperation with Sea-Land and Matson
The process of standardization was proceeding nicely, but the economic
benefit of standardization was not clear. Although 10-, 20-, 30- and 40-foot
containers had become American and international standards, the demand
from shippers or ship lines for these “standard” sizes was not really high. It
was found that 30-foot containers were not being used by any ship lines and
only 10-foot containers had been purchased due to its handful nature, but the
main carrier using them soon concluded that it would not buy more. The
international standards were not generally accepted in the market. The non-
standard containers continued to dominate even the U.S. Government
imposed pressure on carriers to use “standard” sizes. The containers used by
Sea-Land and Matson were 35-foot and 24-foot respectively with 8 feet 6
inches high which accounted for two-thirds of all containers owned by U.S.
ship lines in 1965. Only 16 percent of the containers in service complied
with the standards for length, and a good number of those were not of
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standard 8-foot height. To buy equipment and convert their ships to carry
containers, Sea-Land and Matson had raised tens of millions of dollars of
private capital. By 1965, they were preparing to expand internationally and
might want subsidies to build new ships. If Marad only subsidised to
companies adhering to the “voluntary” MH-5 standards, Sea-Land and
Matson would be at a serious competitive disadvantage. Meanwhile, other
ship lines urged the government to push adoption of standard containers so
that any company could handle others’containers.
Indeed, Sea-Land and Matson were less concerned about the conversion cost
of containers. Instead, they worried about the inefficiency of doing business
brought by the standard containers. Matson president, Stanley Powell,
testified that using 20-foot containers would increase the operating costs by
$500,000 per ship per year in service to the Far East, and would increase
costs for trucks picking up and delivering containers as well. Also, Malcom
McLean, Sea-Land president, showed that switching from 35- to 40-foot
containers would reduce revenues by 7 percent and costs hardly at all.
Although non-standard containers were being used by Sea-Land and Matson,
Marad was ordered by Congress not to discriminate against them, so Matson
was granted its construction subsidy. The company decided years later to
switch from 24-foot containers to 40-foot containers only when the
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adjustable cells conceived to satisfy a congressional committee made the
shift cheap and easy. (Levinson, 2006)
Two controversies over standard containers
Making containers compatible with airplanes, ships, trucks, and trains was
ineffective as the requirements were difficult to satisfy. Air containers are
required to be stronger than maritime containers, and with smooth bottoms
to travel on conveyor belts rather than corner fittings for lifting by cranes.
After months of studies, a separate standard was developed for air containers.
A more serious problem arisen in railway. Since end walls of the containers
bore no great loads when the containers were on ships, the braking of a train
could cause the end of a container to bump into the end of the car. The end
walls in North America demanded twice as strong as those needed by ship
lines, to reduce the potential for damage claims. However, increasing the
strength of end wall meant to raise the cost and weight, hence maritime
interests resisted stronger end walls. By 1970, the bitter battles among
competing economic interests came to the end as the ISO published the first
full draft of its painstakingly negotiated standards. (Levinson, 2006)
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Creation of international container shipping
After 1966, as truckers, ship lines, railroads, container manufacturers, and
governments reached compromises on issue after issue, a fundamental
change could be seen in the shipping world. The standardization of container
shapes and sizes enhanced the development of containerization in 1965.
Leasing companies’ confidence was boosted by investing large sums in
containers and moving into the field in a big way, soon owning more boxes
than the ship lines themselves. Besides Sea-Land, which still used mainly
35-foot containers, and Matson, which was gradually reducing its fleet of
24-foot containers, almost all of the world’s major ship lines were using
compatible containers. Finally, international container shipping could
become a reality. (Levinson, 2006) The weight and dimensions of the most
common types of containers used worldwide are shown in Appendix 1.
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CHAPTER THREE
CONTAINER PORT: PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
BACKGROUND OF PORT OF HONG KONG
With a port history over 160 years and serving as a Container Port in the
recent 30 years, the port of Hong Kong is a major hub port which is served
by about 80 international shipping lines providing about 500 container liner
services per week connecting to over 500 destinations worldwide. The major
cargo handling facilities include container terminals, river trade terminal,
mid-stream sites, public cargo working areas as well as supporting facilities,
such as ship repair yards and typhoon shelters. Hong Kong’s port handles 80
percent of the Hong Kong’s total freight. It is estimated by the Government
that close to 80 percent of the container cargo come from the Pearl River
Delta (PRD) Region of the Mainland. (Hong Kong Economic Services
Bureau Port and Maritime Division, Planning Department, and Marine
Department, 2001)
There is no doubt that Hong Kong has maintained its position as the world’s
busiest Container Port up to 2006 with the total container throughput
reaching about 23.5 million Twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) in which
68 percent of the throughput was handled by Kwai Chung-Tsing Yi
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container terminals’ amounted to 16 million TEUs. The remaining 32
percent container throughput was handled at mid-stream sites, River Trade
Terminal, Public Cargo Working Areas, buoys and anchorages, and other
wharves according to the Hong Kong Port Development Council (PDC) of
the HKSAR Government. The capacity and berth information of Container
Terminal 1 to 9 are demonstrated in Appendix 6 to 9.
The success of port in Hong Kong is due to the coordination of hardware
and software. The superb deep-water harbour, proximity to the Pearl River
Delta Region, laissez-faire policies adopted by the Government, and an
efficient system of port facilities are the major “hardwares” installed in the
territory for the port and container industry to operate. The entrepreneurial
people who are profit-motivated and responsive to market changes; the well-
established banking, financial, insurance and legal systems providing wide
ranges of services; the efficient information communication network; simple
documentation and custom inspection procedures are the “softwares” which
enhance efficiency in handling port activities.
Nevertheless, Hong Kong is one of the few major international ports in the
world, does not have a port authority, where port facilities are financed,
owned and operated by the private sector. The Government’s role is to
undertake long-term strategic planning for port facilities and to provide the
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necessary supporting back-up land, navigation channels infrastructure. On
average, some 231,000 ships, comprising both ocean vessels and river
vessels for cargo and passenger traffic, visit the port of Hong Kong yearly.
HISTORICAL REVIEW OF CONTAINER TERMINALS
IN HONG KONG6
1842-1965: Initiatives of Early Planning
The role of Hong Kong as an entrepot can be traced back to as early as 1842.
Following the end of the first opium war in 1842, the Treaty of Nanjing
which ceded Hong Kong to Britain in perpetuity stated that it was
“obviously necessary and desirable that British subjects should have some
port whereat they may careen and refit their ships”. The deep water harbour,
which is close to the Pearl River, offered a safe haven for ships. The growth
in popularity as a major trading port posted the necessity for the
Government to lay moorings for the large vessels to operate. In addition to
the effort of the Government, private companies also contributed by building
and operating piers and wharves which were associated with godowns.
6 The information in this section is based on the Pryor, E. G. 1991. Hong kong's port and
airport development strategy: A foundation for growth and Ng, M.-k. 1992. The politics
of planning and regional development: A case study of the container port and airport
development in hong kong.
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Several schemes for port development were worked out in the early
twentieth century. In 1924, the Port Engineer of the Port Development
Department, Mr. J. Duncan, devised a plan concerning development of
wharves and godowns in various locations in the territory. However, his plan
was taken no action because it was never proved that there was a real need
for such projects and due to the financial stringency following on the
General Strike and Boycott (1925-1926).
In 1929, a Hong Kong Harbour Board was set up to give advice on the
development and operation of the port. Two years later, the Board was
replaced by Harbour Advisory Committee which was lasted until the
commencement of the Japanese occupation. In early 1941, a report on the
“Future Control and Development of the Port of Hong Kong” was compiled
by Sir David Owen, proposing the set up of a “Hong Kong Harbour Trust”,
the formation of a number of reclamations and the development of new,
deep-water berths at Kowloon Point and Hung Hom served by extensions of
the Kowloon-Canton Railway (KCR). Nevertheless, the proposals were not
realized due to Japanese occupation since late 1941. Some of the plans were
realized only many years later following the return of peace.
In 1948, Sir Patrick Abercrombie formulated the first strategic plan for
Hong Kong. The planning report reflected a number of suggestions which
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includes constructing an industrial/ port development zone connected with
railway and additional wharves and reclamation. Yet, the plans had to be
shelved due to the sudden influx of refugees from China and the United
Nations embargo on trade in 1951. It was a serious attack on Hong Kong’s
trade business with China as China’s re-exports plummeted.
Then over the next two decades, the trade of the port was mainly handled in
conventional ways at mid-stream buoys and at privately owned and operated
wharves. Until in the early 1960s, container ships were introduced on
scheduled shipping routes between the U.S.A. and Western Europe. The
Government then immediately set up a Container Committee7 of senior level
officials and representatives of port operators in 1966 and since then
Containerization has been gathering momentum throughout the world.
7 Apart from the study conducted by the Container Committee, there were a number of
independent studies undergoing in parallel. For instance, Colony Outline Plan was
prepared, covering a 20-year period from 1966 to 1986. As far as port development is
concerned, the plan anticipated the development of container terminals at Kwai Chung
and the continued use of mid-stream buoys. Although the Plan was conceived to be rather
unsophisticated, in other sense, it did help to establish the importance of an integrated
approach for long-term port development.
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1966-1976: “Container Revolution” and
Private Sector-led Development
In the face of the competitive container cargo services, a Container
Committee was appointed by the Governor on July 12, 1966 to “consider the
implications for Hong Kong’s trade and industry of the recent rapid world-
wide development of container transportation services and to make
recommendations on the need for suitable container handling facilities for
the port of Hong Kong and the method of their provision” (Container
Committee, 1966).
The membership of the Container Committee was noteworthy which mainly
consisted of representatives from the container industry: two representatives
of wharf and godown interests; a representative of the Chinese
Manufacturer’s Association; two representatives of shipping liner service
companies; a representative of the Hong Kong General Chamber of
Commerce; a representative of the Federation of Hong Kong Industries; the
Superintendent of Crown Lands and Survey; two representatives of the
Director of Commerce and Industry and a representative of the Economy
Secretary, Colonial Secretariat. The Committee was chaired by a Justice of
Peace with a civil servant from the Marine Department acting as the
secretary. According to Ng (1992), this composition suggested that the
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Container Port development was considered as a purely economic issue and
therefore should be confined to the trade and industrial sectors. Neither
professional planners nor the general public was involved. It also reflected
the lack of planning concerns within the Government at that time.
The principal task of the Committee was “to decide whether the plans and
potential of the existing wharf and godown companies would be adequate to
meet the requirements of the container carrier, as far ahead as one could
reasonably predict; and if not, whether completely new facilities must be
provided; what those requirement would be; who would operate them; on
what terms” (Container Committee, 1966). The Committee concluded that
“unless a container terminal is available in Hong Kong to serve these
[containers] ships, the trading position of the Colony will be affected
detrimentally” (Container Committee, 1966:10).
After considering all possible sites on Hong Kong Island, the mainland (i.e.
Kowloon) and the whole coastline of the harbour from Lei Yue Mun to
Tsuen Wan, the Terminal Sub-Committee advised that “95 acres of
unreclaimed seabed at Kwai Chung for a container terminal and in addition,
an area of some 20 acres should be reserved for a period of 5 years in the
first instance to meet anticipated demands for expansion or associated
storage facilities” (Container Committee, 1966:11).
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The Committee suggested that “if institutional investment is to be attracted,
Government participation may be necessary in some degree” (Container
Committee, 1966:11). However, although the Committee suggested that
Government investment in Container Port development might be necessary,
full control of container terminals by the private sector was essential to
make the enterprise successful. This idea was expressly stated as “the
Shipping carrier group were emphatic in saying that there was unanimous
agreement among shipping companies as a group, that control of operations
throughout the container movement must be in the hands of the container
operator, and complete control must extend to container ship berths as well
as other facilities. Complete control was essential if success in this new field
was to be achieved, whether that control is exercised by means of a lease
over berth and marshalling areas, or by guaranteed use and control of the
berth at that time required accompanies by a lease of marshalling areas.”
Subsequently, in the October 1967 Report of the Container Committee, it
was recommend that the “Government should proceed forthwhile with the
planning and development of Stage I of the Kwai Chung Scheme… ; and that
studies should be initiated immediately by Government and the industry as
to the means by which the Schemes may be financed” (Container Committee,
1967). This decision had a lot to do with economic conditions at that time.
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In 1968, the 1966 and 1967 riots due to the banking crisis returned to
normal.8 The investment climate was improved.
In 1970, tenders were called for the sale of four containership berths with
related “back-up” area. Each berth was 1000 feet with an alongside depth of
40 feet. Berths went to Britain’s Modern Terminals and Sea-Land Orient of
the United States. For joint development to cut costs, the latter entered into
negotiations with the Japanese, represented by Oyama Lines. The
Government also constructed complementary access roads and a flyover
with work under way on three container berths at Kwai Chung. Meanwhile,
individual multi-million dollar container conversion plans were pushed
ahead by several wharfing companies. The biggest were those of North
Point Wharves and the Hong Kong and Kowloon Wharf.
The planning of two further container terminal lots was finalized in 1971.
By 1972, new access roads in Kwai Chung were ready in time for the
opening of the first container berth. The first berth of the container complex
at Kwai Chung was officially opened for use on September 5, 1972. This
8 After the banking crisis in 1965, civil riots broke out in 1966 and 1967. Land sales fell,
and the 1966 government budget was in the red. The manufactory sector faced problems
of labour shortages and technology stagnation. The problems can only be solved by either
letting in more immigrants or increasing productivity. However, new investments in the
private sector were postponed as a result of labour disputes and demonstrations in 1967.
The Government, therefore, became very cautious in capital spending after riots of 1966
and 1967.
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marked the beginning of a new era of cargo transportation for Hong Kong.
Berth One was owned and operated by Modern Terminals Limited (MTL)
and it involved an investment of HK$155 million. It had an area of about 37
acres. Berth Two was built by Kowloon Container Warehouse Ltd, backed
mainly by Japanese shipping interests with Oyama as the prime mover.
Berth Three was owned by the Sea-Land Orient which had been operating
containerships to the US for more than two years, using Kowloon Docks’
facilities.
In 1971, the foreign trade of the PRC increased9 and so was the need for
containerization. Chinese ports could not handle this growing need which
helped to boost container traffic in Hong Kong. In 1975, Hong Kong’s two
major ship-handling combines, Modern Terminals Limited (MTL) and the
Hong Kong and Kowloon Wharf and Godown Company Limited, joined
hands in building Terminal Five.
The Kwai Chung container terminal was completed in 1976 despite the
stock market crash in 1973, the Oil Crisis and the world economic recession
in 1974 ad 1975. It had the capacity to handle up to equivalent of 1.5 million
20-foot containers a year and was then ranked the fourth largest in the world
and the second largest in Asia. There were six berths totalling more than
9 U.S. President Richard Nixon lifted the 20-year old trade embargo from the PRC.
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6000 feet giving onto about 150 acres of cargo handling space, which
included container yards and container freight stations. Six “third
generation” container ships could be simultaneously accommodated and
worked at these berths, all of which were operated by private companies or
consortia. Until then, the administration and private terminal operators
confined the planning and development of the Container Port.
1977-1987: China’s “Open Door Policy”, the Joint Declaration and
Further Expansion at Kwai Chung
In the late 1970s, the construction of large scale infrastructure projects were
initiated by the Government such as the Mass Transit Railway and the
reclamation of land in the New Territories for the development of new
towns. The emergence of Hong Kong as an international financial centre
made the financing of these projects possible. Money supply increased from
HK$176.8 billion in 1981 to HK$457.8 billion in 1985. Also, the amount of
loans to finance capital construction increased from HK$24.1 billion in 1981
to HK$33.8 billion in 1985 and HK$103.1 billion in 1990.
China’s Open Door Policy, in early 1979, increased economic transactions
between Hong Kong and southern China especially the Pearl River Delta
and helped sustain Hong Kong’s traditional regime of accumulation, i.e.
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labour-intensive industries producing cheap consumer goods for the world
market. Manufacturers moved their factories across the border to the Pearl
River Delta due to the cheap land and labour resources. Raw materials or
semi-finished products are sent there for processing before export to final
markets. Therefore, there was a boom for Hong Kong container port
business. The number of containers handled in the port increased
dramatically from 1.55 million Twenty-foot Equivalent Units (TEUs) in
1981 to 4.44 million in 1989. The value of Hong Kong’s domestic exports to
the PRC increased at an average annual growth rate of more than 120
percent between 1978 and 1984, jumping from HK$81 million to
HK$11,280 million. Re-export also grew spectacularly, from HK$214
million in 1978 to HK$28,060 million in 1984.
Given the drastic increase of transactions between Hong Kong and China,
there was a need for having a second site for container terminal. Junk Bay,
Tuen Mun and Lantau were suggested by the Chamber of Commerce as
three possible sites for the second container terminal. Subsequently in 1982,
the Container Port Executive Committee was established as advisor of the
Director of Marine on matters relating to the container port at Kwai Chung
and its future development. In the Study on Harbour Reclamation and Urban
Growth commenced in the same year, the Government concluded a
substantial expansion of the container port in Kwai Chung area and future
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expansion off south-eastern Tsing Yi Island are the two port development
possibilities. Since 1983, “trigger point mechanism” has been employed in
planning container port development in future.
In 1984 Territory Development Strategy (TDS) was completed, including
provisions for development of additional container terminals at Kwai Chung.
In the same year, the government completed negotiation with the Hongkong
International Terminals (HIT) to build Terminal Six. HIT reclaimed the
Kwai Chung Creek to increase 57 percent of the efficient working capacity
of the container terminal to 2.2 million TEUs a year. The reclamation cost
was HK$655 million and was completed in 1987. In the second phase, a
further 28 hectares of land was reclaimed by HIT to provide three additional
berths and associated terminal facilities in 1987. The project was completed
in May 1989, making Terminal Six then the biggest container terminal
facility in the world. In 1986, the “in-house” Port Development Strategy 10
(PDS) came to completion.
10 It aimed to provide a framework for the long-term development of container terminals
at Stonecutters Island up to 2001, rearrangement and additional provision of mid stream
buoys and other port facilities. However, it included no engineering feasibility
investigation and only remained as a piece of paper work.
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In order to cope with the increasing demand 11 in 1987, more container
terminals had to be built. In April, 1988, HIT bid HK$4.39 billion to build
and manage Terminal 7, which was adjacent to HIT’s Terminals 4 and 6 and
its capacity doubled that of the Kwai Chung Container Port. This extremely
high bid by HIT was criticized by the Beijing-owned China Merchant’s
Navigation Company Ltd. (which bid for HK$2.7 billion) as it caused the
land prices be inflated to an extent where Hong Kong might no longer be
competitive. However, from the Government’s point of view, container
terminal development did contribute significantly to the Government’s
revenue. After securing the development of Terminal 7, HIT became the
dominant interest in container port development.
The old British “hongs” (companies) in the territory was challenged by the
evolution of ownership patterns of the container terminals reflects the rise of
Chinese and Hong Kong economic interests. Originally, Terminals 1 and 5
were built by MTL, mainly composed of old British hongs. However, in
1980, Sir Yue-kong Pao, a local Chinese, paid HK$2.1 billion to buy the
control of British-owned Wharf Holdings and made MTL come firmly under
the control of local capital. Terminal 2, which was originally built by the
Japanese, was later bought by the HIT. In 1988, MTL took over the right of
11 15 million tonnes out of a total of 62 million tonnes of good in 1986 was containerised,
the figure jumped to 23 million out of 70 million tonnes in 1987. Re-export in terms of
value also increased from HK$64,784 in 1986 to HK$98,213 in 1987.
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developing Terminal 2 to swap its right in developing Terminal 6. Terminal
4, 6 and 7 were built by the HIT which was 66.5 percent owned by Mr. Lee
Ka-shing’s Hutchison Whampoa. Mr. Lee is the biggest property tycoon in
Hong Kong. The development of container port was thus almost
monopolized by HIT and MTL with over 50 percent and 40 percent
respectively.
Late 1980s-Present: “New Politics” - Strategic and Continuous
Planning in Response to Demand: PADS
A new planning process of port development was established when the Port
and Airport Development Strategy (PADS) for Hong Kong was initiated by
Government in 1988 and completed in 1989. The Strategy was intended to
“meet forecast needs over the medium and long terms in a way which would
be acceptable from an overall strategic planning point of view, taking
account of a possible range of demand forecasts and likely resource
constraints.” (Hong Kong Government Secretariat: Lands and Work Branch,
1989) The Study was carried out by consultants appointed by the Secretary
for Lands & Works. In case a consensus could not be reached, decision-
making and consultation were to be resorted to a hierarchy within the
Government at three levels: six specialist working groups, a study steering
group and a high-level policy and coordinating group. These groups were
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formed from a variety of disciplines from senior levels of the Government,
specialist consultants and advisory bodies. Compared to the first intentional
port planning conducted in 1966, it showed an improvement in port planning
towards a more comprehensive level by the involvement of specialists and
different bodies this time and more balanced views on different issues could
be gathered. Yet, the government intervention ideology in port planning
remains unchanged as in the earlier stages which can be revealed by the
involvement of various government officials in the process.
On March 8 1988, consultants, who were appointed by the then Secretary
for Lands and Works to produce a long term Port and Airport Development
Strategy (PADS) for Hong Kong, had to advise on the best location for the
container terminals 8 and 9 in response to the rapid surge of trading
activities. The consultants were not involved in the selection process of the
optimal sites of the three scenarios, which were shortlisted by the
administration. They were employed only to compare and point out the
implications if any one of the scenarios is chosen. Moreover, the
Government restricted the operation of the consultants within the planning
scope. The consultants were not only given the goals and objectives, but also
the study parameters, capacity studies, demand requirement forecast, and the
evaluation criteria. Collection of information like land-use supplies was also
out of the question of the consultants. Instead, the Government gave this
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task to individual consultants or working groups within the bureaucracy. All
these showed a strong government interventionist ideology of port planning.
With the information given, the PADS consultants undertook the process to
identify areas available for locating port, airport, transport links and other
compatible development areas. Upon the completion of the PADS study, the
focus of the port development has been shifted to the formulation of a long-
term development plan at strategic level. The HKSAR government started
playing an important role in the coordination of the port development
process and central to the Government’s work is to forecast Hong Kong’s
future growth in terms of freight throughput. Moreover, since PADS was
completed in 1989, four Port Development Strategy Reviews (PDSR) had
been carried out to ensure that Hong Kong’s port development can keep up
with the times and global development, and can maintain a competitive
position. (Hong Kong Economic Services Bureau Port and Maritime
Division, Planning Department, and Marine Department, 2001)
Facing the introduction of PADS by the government, the two container
giants, HIT and MTL, were having different opinions and fierce competition.
HIT, which practically owned all the spare capacity in the Container Port,
had persistently opposed to further expand the container terminals. However,
MTL was rather keen to expand spatially to accommodate the growing
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demands of its customers. Their rivalry was complicated by the PRC’s plans
for new container ports in the Pearl River Delta.
On the other hand, the accelerated development of the container ports was
criticized by the local communities. Due to the growth and expansion of the
container ports, Kwai Chung had meanwhile developed rapidly into an
important industrial and residential district, conflicts of land uses resulted.
The Kwai Chung District Board argued that new container terminals should
be located further from residential areas with supplementary land for
parking, loading and unloading trucks. Independent road networks should be
provided for the ports.
As mentioned, ever since 1983, the “trigger point mechanism” has been used
to plan future development of container terminals. In essence, the “trigger
point” is reached when the level of throughput is 65 percent of the maximum
capacity of the container terminals. Then, new facilities must be brought into
operation. The actual growth rate per annum in total cargo and containerised
cargo between 1986 and 1991 was greater than the forecast made by the
Container Port Committee in 1989. Based on the actual growth rate, it was
estimated that a new Container Terminal 8 would be required by mid 1994
and Container Terminal 9 would be required by October 1995. (Hong Kong
Government Secretariat: Lands and Work Branch, 1989) The consultants
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identified nine potential sites for Terminal 8 and 9 which were Tsing Yi,
Stonecutters Island, Siu Lam and Tai Po. Eventually, Tsing Yi or
Stonecutters Island was recommended by the Consultants for Terminal 8. It
was noted that in the Port Development Strategy Study completed in 1986,
the site at Stonecutters Island was also recommended by the Marine
Department.
However, the two identified sites at Tsing Yi and Stonecutters Island
identified were close to existing terminals and manufacturing centres in
Kwai Chung and West Kowloon, so difficulties were encountered for both
sites. Local residents had not been consulted throughout the planning and
decision-making process, even though they demanded more information.
Residents on Tsing Yi Island requested for a delay in the decision on the
siting of Terminal 8. Ten community groups in Tsing Yi argued that Tsing
Yi Island, which was already crowded with potentially hazards installations
such as the Liquid Petroleum Gas storage plant and chemical plants, was
constrained by the congested road network and therefore was not suitable for
the development of Terminal 8.
In February 1989, Lai Wan Concern Group and the Shun Shui Po
Development Service Center argued that if Stonecutters Island was chosen,
residents at the Mei Foo Sun Chuen and Ching Lai Court would be further
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disturbed by noise, light, water pollution and traffic congestion. They also
suggested that there should be an overall policy in the development of
container terminals over the territory, taking the environmental factors,
influences on local residents and supportive infrastructure networks into
account (Hong Kong Standard, Feb. 20, 1989). Despite of the public
opinions, it was announced by the Governor that Terminal 8 would be built
on reclaimed land at Stonecutters Island and Terminal 9 and its support
facilities would be built on reclaimed land at south-east Tsing Yi Island. The
total cost of the new port development was estimated to be about HK$55
billion (at 1989 prices). It is expected that some 80 percent of the required
financing will come from the private sector.
HIT, owner of Terminal 7, also continued to attack the Government’s
decision to expand the Kwai Chung container port through the media since
Terminal 7 had not reached its full capacity and there was no need for
further expansion. Mr. Simon Murray, managing director of Hutchison
Wharnpoa and chairman of HIT, called for a reappraisal of PADS. He
argued the expansion of Kwai Chung should take into consideration the port
developments in China, including the extensive reclamation work under way
in Shenzhen, Chiwan, Chekou and Yantian which are close to Hong Kong.
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Additionally, Singapore and Kaohsiung (in Taiwan) challenged Hong
Kong’s position as the dominant transshipment port for the region. In 1991,
Singapore in fact took Hong Kong’s place as the number one container port
in the world in terms of throughput. Also, Hong Kong’s importance as an
entrepot port reduced due to the improvement in relations between the PRC
on one hand and Taiwan and South Korea on the other which may lead to
the introduction of direct shipping services. On the other hand, MTL, a rival
of HIT in container cargo handling, favoured the construction of Terminal 9
in south-east Tsing Yi as it is adjacent to terminals currently under their
operation (Ng, 1992) and MTL argued that HIT had been against the
building of Terminal 9 because they would like over-spill demand from
terminal users to go to Terminal 7 which still has spare capacity. Also, MTL
considered that Chinese ports lacked the important hard and soft
infrastructure to make them successful and therefore in short and medium
terms, ports in the PRC would not rival the Hong Kong ports (Ng, 1992).
HIT and MTL formed a consortium on a 50-50 basis to develop Terminal 8
on a Private Treaty Grant eventually in March 1991. The consortium paid a
HK$2 billion land premium. The PRC’s vested interest in container port
developments in Hong Kong was fully reflected in the development of
Terminal 8. China-backed China Ocean Shipping Corporation (Cosco)
entered in an agreement with HIT to invest and operate two inner berths of
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Terminal 8. The China Merchant Holdings Company which is owned by
China’s Ministry of Communications also negotiated with MTL, which will
own and operate the two outer berths, for a 20 percent shareholding in MTL.
In 2001, MTL, HIT and ACT had entered into a Joint Development
Agreement (“JDA”) to jointly procure the construction of Container
Terminal 9. The total cost of construction for the whole Container Terminal
9 is estimated to be HK$4.8 billion with a target completion date in 2005.
MTL, ACT and HIT agreed to share the construction cost at an agreed ratio
as stipulated in the JDA. Furthermore, under a Berth Swap Agreement with
ACT, upon the completion of the whole of Container Terminal 9, MTL
transferred to ACT all of its rights, title and interest in Container Terminal 8
West and ACT transferred to MTL all of its rights, title and interest in
Container Terminal 9. (The Wharf (Holdings) Limited, 2001)
In 2005, two new players, Dubai’s DP World and Singapore’s PSA
International, entered the terminal business. The move changed the situation
that had been held by the four existing terminal operators, i.e. HIT, MTL,
Cosco-HIT and CSX World Terminals. DP World acquired CSX World
Terminals from US transport giant CSX Corp in January 2005 and gained an
initial foothold at the Kwai Chung container terminals. This gave DP World
a stake at Container Terminal 3 and CT8 (West), in addition to operations in
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China. One month later PSA International bought out the interest held by
Hong Kong infrastructure company NWS Holdings and had been CSX
World Terminals’ partner in CT3 and CT8 (West). As a result, PSA
International acquired NWS Holdings’ 33.34 percent stake in CT3 and its
31.4 percent interest in Asia Container Terminals Holdings (ACT), which
operated CT8 (West). PSA then used US$4.39bn in April to acquire 20
percent of the equity and loan structure of Hutchison’s ports network. While
the agreement made PSA a partner in Hutchison’s global business, it also
cemented its interest in Hong Kong’s container terminal scene, which has
increased to five companies.
MTL remains the oldest of the bunch after opening the territory’s first
purpose-built container terminal at Kwai Chung in 1972. The company,
which operates nine berths including two feeder berths, has the capacity to
handle 5.5m TEUs at its four terminals – container terminals 1, 2, 5 and 9
(South). In March 2005, the company handled its 50 millionth container
since it began operating 33 years previously. Meanwhile, they used HK$1bn
(US$128.5m) for upgrade of its facilities, which was completed in 2006.
These improvements in operating efficiency helped support the rec-
ommendation of the government-funded Hong Kong Port Master Plan 2020
to improve existing operations at Kwai Chung before constructing additional
terminals. Similar improvements by other terminal operators are expected to
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boost the port’s total throughput to 24m TEUs a year. (Hong Kong Marine
Department, 2006)
Conclusive Remark
It was found in the above discussion that in 1966-1967, when the container
revolution was making its impacts on the economy of Hong Kong, the
administration was in a very difficult position. The riots in Hong Kong at
that time rendered the British Colonial Government of Hong Kong cautious
over public expenditure. However, the economy of Hong Kong would suffer
seriously if containerization was not implemented because manufactory and
trading activities were the life blood of Hong Kong at that time. The
Government, therefore, had no choice but to let the private sector develop ad
operate the container ports. Therefore it could be seen that the Container
Port development was initiated by the market while the Government had
played a passive and reactive role in the first phase of the container port
history in 1970-1976 (Ng, 1992). After the PRC’s Open Door Policy in 1979
and the settlement of Hong Kong’s uncertain political future by the Sino-
British Joint Declaration in 1984, a more proactive approach had been
adopted by the Government in planning the container ports. Given the
changing politics of planning in the territory since the 1980s, this second
phase of the container port development has aroused public concern, but
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their concerns had largely been ignored because the established planning
mechanisms for developing the container ports were immune from public
pressure and security.
On the other hand, the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s vested interests
in Hong Kong’s container port development had grown as a result of the
Open Door Policy and Hong Kong was an important entrepot port for the
PRC’s imports and exports. These interests guaranteed a relatively smooth
planning and implementation of the container port development in Hong
Kong. Up to the 1980s, the Government together with the private sector had
been the main actors in planning and developing container ports. Recently,
PRC has joined this partnership. Established institutions do not allow
meaningful and effective wizen participation in the course of events. Hence,
those in power take all the important decisions while the general public,
especially the local communities, have to bear the consequences.
When the Container Port Executive Committee was first established in 1982,
there were representatives from relevant Government Departments and
container terminal operators. In 1988, this Committee was disbanded. The
Port Committee, the Port Operation Committee and the Container Terminal
Landuse Sub-Committee were subsequently set up to advise on policy issues
and day-to-day operation of the ports. In 1991, these Committees were
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replaced by the Port Development Board (PDB) which is under the Land
Development Policy Committee. Unofficial members of the Port
Development Board are appointed by the Government. Under the Port Board,
there are three sub-committees. One of them is Container Cargo Handling
Committee, members of which are nominated by the PDB secretariat (civil
servants) and approved by the PDB. Shipping, banking, container operators,
and related professional interests are represented in the PDB and the
Container Cargo Handling Committee.
However, there is no representative from local communities on these
committees. In fact, there is no channel to inform and consult local residents
about the planning and development of container ports and their interests
have been neglected. Without citizen participation, many controversial
issues can then be “submerged” and decisions can be made behind closed
doors. This is an unfair practice. The community at large should have an
opportunity to question on the port development and the corresponding
negative impacts such as pollution problems. Only a more open approach
can guarantee better information, more realistic predictions, a more rounded
perspective, more understanding and more imaginative and “rational” results.
After the completion of PADS, Hong Kong has approached a strategic level,
which is concerned with the long-term development of the port and the basis
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of port planning system in Hong Kong has been formed. The port planning
is involving more expertise and specialists like planners, economists and
statisticians. In addition, the issues considered in the process are getting
more comprehensive, covering environmental and social issues.
OPERATORS OF CONTAINER TERMINALS12
Overview
The Hong Kong International Container Terminals (named Kwai Chung
Container Terminals until Container Terminal 9 was opened on Tsing Yi)
are situated in Kwai Chung-Tsing Yi basin. There are nine terminals under
the operation of five different operators, namely Modern Terminals Ltd
(MTL), Hongkong International Terminals Ltd (HIT), COSCO-HIT, DP
World and Asia Container Terminals Ltd (ACT). (Appendix 2) They occupy
275 hectares of land which includes container yards and container freight
stations and provides 24 berths and 8,530 metres deep water frontage. The
water depth of the Kwai Chung-Tsing Yi basin is 15.5 m. The total handling
capacity of the container terminals is over 18 million TEUs per year.
12 The information is this section is based on the website of the terminal operators,
Working for you - the port of Hong Kong: Handbook & Directory by Hong Kong Marine
Department & Critical Review of Port Planning System in Hong Kong by Wong
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Table 1 Development Sequence and Operators of Container Terminal 1-9
Reference: Hong Kong’s Port and Airport Development Strategy – A Foundation for
Growth and the Annual Reports and homepages of Container Terminal Operators
Opening Date Operator
Terminal 1 September 1972 Modern Terminals Ltd. (MTL)
Terminal 2 During 1973 Kowloon Container Warehouse
(1973)
Hong Kong International
Terminals Ltd. (HIT) (February
1976)
Modern Terminals Ltd. (MTL)
(February 1989)
Terminal 4 April 1976 Hongkong International Terminals
Ltd.(HIT)
Terminal 5 March 1976 Modern Terminals Ltd. (MTL)
Terminal 6 1st berth May 1988
2nd berth January 1989
Hongkong International Terminals
Ltd. (HIT)
Terminal 7 1st berth November 1989
2nd berth January 1990
3rd berth April 1990
4th berth September 1990
Hongkong International Terminals
Ltd. (HIT)
Terminal 8 Situated in northern corner
of Stonecutters Island
January 1994
Cosco-HIT Terminals (Hong
Kong) Ltd. (CHT) owns 2 berths in
the east (CT8 E)
2 berths in the west (CT8W),
which were originally owned and
operated by Modern Terminals
Ltd., have been taken over by ACT
in April 2004.
Terminal 9 Located on Tsing Yi
Island, facing Rambler
Channel
The berths were completed
by the year 2005.
The terminal was developed by 3
operators, (MTL), (HIT), and Asia
Container Terminals Limited
(ACT).
Current, HIT has 2 berths in CT9
and MTL owns the remaining 4.
78
Modern Terminal Limited (MTL)
Modern Terminals Limited was established in 1969 and now a major player
in the Container Port industry. By 1972, Modern Terminals had built Hong
Kong’s first custom designed Container Terminal. This was the forerunner
of the Hong Kong container shipping industry which established Modern
Terminals as the industry leader. Modern Terminals is a privately owned
company with a shareholder portfolio of regional industry leaders: The
Wharf (Holdings) Ltd (68 percent); China Merchants Holdings
(International) Co Ltd (27 percent); and Jebsen Securities Ltd (5 percent).
The annual throughput of MTL is 5.4 million TEUs and the annual capacity
reached 7 million TEUs in 2006. Moreover, MTL offers to users a total of
over 1,000,000 square feet of storage space in the form of an on-terminal 11-
storey warehouse building which is located in Berth One in Kwai Chung.
Hongkong International Terminals (HIT)
Hongkong International Terminals (HIT), established in 1969, is the flagship
operation of the Hutchison Port Holdings (HPH) Group, the world’s leading
port investor, developer and operator. HIT is situated in the Kwai Chung
container port area of Hong Kong and one of the busiest container ports.
HIT operates twelve berths at Terminals 4, 6, 7 and 9 and another two
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through its joint venture with COSCO Pacific Limited at Terminal 8 (East).
In 2006, HIT and COSCO-HIT handled a combined throughput of 8.235
million TEU, over 50 percent of Kwai Tsing’s container port traffic. The
Hutchison Logistics Centre located at Container Terminal 4 with over
377,000 square metres of floor space also houses HIT’s own container
freight station operations.
China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company (COSCO)
COSCO Pacific Limited has a 50 percent interest in COSCO-HIT Terminals
(Hong Kong) Limited, a container terminal located at Kwai Chung, Hong
Kong. COSCO-HIT Terminals (CHT) Limited, a joint venture between
China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company and Hongkong International
Terminals (HIT), manages two berths at Terminal 8 East, Kwai Chung.
These berths have a quay length of 640 metres and a minimum along side
depth of 15.5 metres. The terminal is capable of handling two container
vessels simultaneously. The use of advanced computer systems and
communications equipment has been used since it become operational in
1995. The Annual handling capacity of COSCO is 1.8 million TEUs in 2007.
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Dubai Port International Terminals Ltd. (DPI) 13
DPI (DP World since 2005), one of the world’s leading port operators,
announced on February 22 2005 that it had completed the acquisition of
CSX World Terminals (CSX WT), the international terminal business of
CSX Corporation, for closing cash consideration of USD1.142billion,
subject to final working capital and long-term debt adjustments. This places
DPI among the world top six port operators. The acquisition of CSX WT
gave DPI a strong presence in Asia for the first time, including CT3 and
CT8W in Hong Kong, Tianjin and Yantai in China as well as operations in
Australia, Germany, Dominican Republic and Venezuela. The combined
portfolio consists of interests in 15 operational terminals in 13 locations with
a combined capacity in excess of 24million TEU. Container Terminal 3,
located in the heart of Hong Kong’s Kwai Chung port, is now operated by
DP World since it acquired CSX WT.
DP World Hong Kong is recognised as the most productive terminal
operator in Hong Kong with an average productivity over 40 moves per hour
per shore crane, handling over 1.2 million TEUs in record in a single berth.
Apart from the premier terminal service, they also provide ancillary services
13 DP World was formed in September 2005 with the integration of the terminal operations of the Dubai
Ports Authority (DPA), which was focused on the UAE ports of Rashid and Jebel Ali, and DPI (Dubai
Ports International) which had been set up to export this success internationally.
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like on-dock equipment repair and maintenance as well as dedicated vessel
and cargo agency services.
PSA International Limited
In April 2005, PSA used US$4.39billion to acquire 20 percent of the equity
and loan structure of Hutchison’s ports network. This agreement made PSA
a partner in Hutchison’s global business, it also cemented its interest in
Hong Kong’s container terminal scene. PSA has now investments in 17 out
of the 24 container berths in Hong Kong’s port that stretches across a total
quay length of 6,125 metres. This includes two berths at CT8 West, one
berth at CT3, 12 berths at CT4, 6, 7 and 9 and another 2 at CT8 East. PSA
International acquired NWS Holdings’ 33.34 percent stake in CT3 and its
31.4 percent interest in Asia Container Terminals Holdings (ACT), which
operated CT8 (West).
Asia Container Terminals Ltd. (ACT)
ACT, incorporated in 1993, is the major stakeholder in the six-berth
Container Terminal 9 (CT9) development at the port of Kwai Chung, Hong
Kong. ACT has an interest in two container berths at CT9. After the
completion of ACT’s two-berth interests at Container Terminal 9 (CT9),
ACT took over the two berths at CT8W in April 2004. ACT is jointly owned
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by DP World (55.2 percent) and PSA International Limited (PSA) (44.8
percent).
On December 30, 2004, before the acquisition by DP World, CSX WT
announced that it had raised its stake in Asia Container Terminals Ltd (ACT)
to 68.6 percent giving the Group a majority share in the operation. ACT is
the owner and operator of the premier terminal CT8W in Hong Kong. The
transaction was financed from a committed loan facility arranged and
underwritten by Deutsche Bank AG on December 16, 2004 for USD1.45
billion.
PERFORMANCE OF CONTAINER PORT:
FORECAST VS ACTUAL GROWTH
According to the statistics on port traffic of Hong Kong 2007 released by
Marine Department, among the container ports of the world, the container
throughput of Hong Kong port ranks the second with the amount up to
23,539,000 TEUs in 2006 and 22,602,000 TEUs in 2005. The performance
of Container Port is measured by twenty-foot equivalent unites (TEUs)
across a standard berth. A 20 feet container counts as 1 TEU while a 40 feet
container counts as 2 TEUs and so on (Hong Kong Planning Department,
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1998). In order to evaluate the port traffic growth of Hong Kong, the
forecast and the actual growth will be compared.
A new planning process of port development was established when the Port
and Airport Development Strategy (PADS) for Hong Kong was initiated by
Government in 1988 and completed in 1989. The Government provided
forecast figures to the PADS consultants so that they could search suitable
sites to accommodate the predicted growth. In 1989, the Container Port
Committee made a forecast on the growth of containerised trade which was
based on forecasts prepared by the Government Working Group on Port
Cargo Forecasts. The forecasts implied growth in total cargo and
containerised cargo of 10.6 percent and 12.2 percent per annum respectively,
between 1986 and 1991. (Hong Kong Government Secretariat: Lands and
Work Branch, 1989) However, since 1986, the actual growth in these
cargoes has been 14 percent and 21 percent per annum. It could then be
observed that the growth of Container Port development was unexpectedly
high.
To ensure that Hong Kong’s port development can keep up with the times
and global development and can maintain a competitive position, four Port
Development Strategy Reviews (PDSRs) had been carried out. According to
“Port Development Strategy Review 2001”, the Port Cargo Forecasts (PCF)
2000/01 predicted a slightly higher magnitude of total container traffic as
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compared with the previous PCF 1997/1998. The higher throughputs
projected in the 2000/01 forecast are mainly due to the anticipated strong
export growth of Southern part of the Mainland, which will be further
boosted by the Mainland’s accession to the WTO. Hong Kong port is
forecast to become increasing reliant on cargo originating from the PRD
area as the main source of cargo. The volume of containers carries by ocean-
going vessels is forecast to reach 30.2 million TEUs by 2020 ad another 10.4
million TEUs will be handled by river trading vessels. This reflects a
gradual increase in the share of river containers from 24 percent in 1999 to
26 percent in 2020.(Hong Kong Economic Services Bureau Port and
Maritime Division, Planning Department, and Marine Department, 2001)
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Table 2 Port Cargo Forecasts (PCF) in Port Development Strategy
Reviews 1997/98 and 2000/01
Ocean14 River Total (million TEUs)
Year 97/98 2000/01 97/98 2000/01 97/98 2000/01
1999 13.8 12.3 3.2 3.9 17.0 16.2
2001 14.4 14.4 3.9 5.2 18.3 19.6
2006 18.2 17.6 5.9 7.7 24.1 25.3
2011 22.1 22.1 7.1 9.0 29.2 31.1
2016 25.5 27.2 7.3 10.0 32.8 37.2
2020 - 30.17 - 10.36 - 40.53
Both the container throughout and the cargo throughout increased gradually
from 1976 to 2007 and approaching the forecast released in the Port
Development Strategy. From this, it could be concluded that the Container
Port development was growing at a pace under the Government’s
expectation. A clearer illustration is shown in the following figures.
14 Changes have been made to the definition of 'ocean' and 'river' cargo under the current
statistics system effective from January 1993. Hence, the two components of port traffic
are subject to differences in the context of historical and forecast data. Prior to 1993,
ocean-going vessels are defined operationally as vessels completing port formalities at
Marine Department's Port Formalities Office. On the other hand, vessels completing port
formalities at its District Marine Offices are defined as river vessels. Under the revised
statistics systems, the classification of vessels into 'ocean' and 'river' is made on the basis
of the legally defined 'river trade limits'. The river trade area broadly includes the Pearl
River and other inland waterways in Guangdong and Guangxi, and Macau. Hong Kong
Port Development Board; Planning Department. 1993/94. Port development strategy
review 1993/94 : Port cargo forecasts.
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Table 3 Forecast and Actual Container throughput in ‘000 TEUs
Forecast ActualYear ‘000 TEUs Reference ‘000 TEUs Reference
1976 1,030
1977 1,260
1978 1,230
1979 1,300
1980 1,460
1981 1,560
1982 1,660
1983 1,840
1984 2,110
1985 2,290
1986 2,700
1987 3,450
Port and Airport
Development Strategy
Background Notes
1988 3,950
1989 4,380
Port Development
Strategy Third Review
1998
1990 5,101
1991 6,162
1992 7,972
1993 9,204
1994 11,050
1995 12,550
1996 13,460
1997
No forecast
14,567
1998 16,012 14,582
1999 16,951 16,211
2000 17,618 18,098
2001 18,319 17,826
2002 19,271 19,144
2003 20,287 20,449
2004 21,448 21,984
2005 22,631 22,602
2006 24,142 23,539
Summary Statistics on
Port Traffic of Hong
Kong Sept 2007
2007 25,697
2008 26,712
2009 27,753
2010 28,472
2011 29,223
2012 29,987
2013 30,736
2014 31,430
2015 32,138
2016 32,837
Port Development
Strategy Third
Review 1998
2020 40,530
Port Development
Strategy Third
Review 2001
N/A
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Table 4 Forecast and Actual Cargo Throughput in ‘000 tonnes
Forecast ActualYear ‘000 tonnes Reference ‘000 tonnes Reference
1976 23,341
1977 25,637
1978 27,832
1979 30,310
1980 33,562
1981 35,619
1982 37,096
1983 43,349
1984 47,480
1985
No forecast
53,655
Port and Airport
Development
Strategy
Background Notes
(1988)
1986 56,300 56,289
1987 N/A 62,966
1988 N/A 71,390
1989 N/A 73,682
1990 N/A 75,294
1991 93,300 87,592
1992 N/A 101,600
1993 N/A 118,138
1994 N/A 141,025
Port Development
Strategy Third
Review 1998
1995 N/A 155,906
1996 138,900
Port & Airport
Development
Strategy: Final
Report 1989
157,299
1997 N/A 169,229
1998 183,014 167,170
1999 194,079 168,838
2000 202,874 174,642
2001 212,355 178,210
2002 223,422 192,511
2003 235,394 207,612
2004 248,725 220,879
2005 262,483 230,139
2006 279,138 238,238
Summary
Statistics on Port
Traffic of Hong
Kong Sept 2007
2007 294,994
2008 307,868
2009 321,209
2010 332,324
2011 344,007
2012 354,302
2013 365,059
2014 375,605
2015 386,500
2016 397,567
Port Development
Strategy Third
Review 1998
N/A
(N/A: Not Available)
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Figure 1 Forecast and Actual Cargo Throughput in ‘000 tonnes, 1976-2016
89
Figure 2 Forecast and Actual Container Throughput in ‘000 TEUs, 1976-2016
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BUSINESS PERFORMANCE OF
CONTAINER TERMINAL OPERATORS
COSCO-HIT Terminal (Hong Kong) Limited (COSCO-HIT) 15
COSCO-HIT Terminals (Hong Kong) Limited (“COSCO-HIT”), an
associated company of the COSCO Pacific Limited, provided handling and
storage services to COSCON for cargoes shipped from/ to Container
Terminal 8 (East) in Hong Kong. The services rendered were charged at
terms pursuant to agreements entered into by COSCO-HIT with COSCON
for the year ended 31st December 2003.
Table 5 COSCO-HIT Terminal Throughput (TEUs) and Growth rate,
1995-2006
Year
Throughput
(‘000 TEUs)
Growth rate Year
Throughput
(‘000 TEUs)
Growth rate
1995 1,193 - 2001 1,302 -7.8 percent
1996 1,153 -3.4 percent 2002 1,526 17.2 percent
1997 1,302 13.0 percent 2003 1,514 -0.8 percent
1998 1,207 -7.4 percent 2004 1,697 12.1 percent
1999 1,220 1.1 percent 2005 1,841 8.5 percent
2000 1,413 15.8 percent 2006 1689 -8.3 percent
Reference: COSCO Pacific Limited Annual Reports 2000-2006
15 The business review of COSCO-HIT Terminal Limited is based on the data available
in Annual Report 2000-2006 of COSCO-Pacific Limited.
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Figure 3 COSCO-HIT Terminal Throughput (TEUs), 1995- 2006
Reference: COSCO Pacific Limited Annual Reports 2000-2006
Figure 4 Profit after income tax of COSCO-HIT Terminal 1999-200616
Reference: COSCO Pacific Limited Annual Reports 2000-2006
16 A further explanation of profit after income tax of COSCO-HIT Terminal Limited is
shown in Appendix 8
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In 2003, the slight decrease in the throughput of COSCO-HIT was due to
the substantial increase in container handling capacity in the region. The
renovation work at COSCO-HIT aimed at enhancing handling capacity to
prepare for handling of 8,000 TEU container ships. Throughput of COSCO-
HIT fell by 0.8 percent over 2002, its profit contribution declined by 5.6
percent due to changes in cargo mix. (COSCO Pacific Limited, 2003)
In 2005, at COSCO-HIT Terminal in Hong Kong, throughput rose 8.5
percent to 1,841,193 TEUs, with demand continuing to grow moderately.
Efforts of COSCO-HIT Terminal in exploring new business opportunities
resulted in throughput being increased to a record high of 1,841,193 TEUs
(2004: 1,697,212 TEUs), while the net profit contribution was slightly
lower than that of 2004 due to changes in cargo mix and increasing interest
rates. (COSCO Pacific Limited, 2005)
During the first half of 2006, the replacement of four quay cranes by
COSCO-HIT Terminals (Hong Kong) Limited directly affected terminal
throughput dropped by 8.3 percent while profit contribution also decreased.
At COSCO-HIT Terminal in Hong Kong, throughput decreased by 8.3
percent. Net profit contribution amounted to US$23,751,000, a 15.1 percent
drop from US$27,981,000 in 2005 as a result of the interruptions to
operations caused by the quay crane replacements. It was mainly affected
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by the construction and replacement of four quay cranes during the first half
of the year which disrupted the terminal’s normal operation for a certain
period of time. The situation had been improved in the second half of the
year. The replacement of the cranes has enhanced the terminal’s capability
to handle larger and more sophisticated vessels with a capacity of over
8,000 TEUs. Nevertheless, it is forecasted by COSCO Pacific Limited that
the container throughput will show sustainable growth due to the
continuous robust growth in China’s import and export trade and the
worldwide shipping market, (COSCO Pacific Limited, 2006)
Modern Terminal Limited (MTL) 17
As mentioned in the previous section, the major shareholder of MTL is the
Wharf (Holdings) Ltd with 68 percent of equity attributable. Therefore, the
business performance of MTL from 1997 to 2006 was reviewed in the
Annual Reports of the Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. As indicated in the Annual
Report 2006, MTL is now transforming from operating at a single port
(Hong Kong) to a portfolio of strategic ports. It operated Taicang
International Container Terminals Company Limited in the Yangtze River
Delta since 2004.
17 The business review of Modern Terminal Limited is based on the information
available in the Annual Reports 1999-2006 of The Wharf (Holdings) Limited
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Figure 5 MTL Throughput (TEUs in millions), 1997-2006
Reference: Annual Reports 1999-2006 of The Wharf (Holdings) Limited
Figure 6 Market share of MTL in the Container Industry, 1997-2006
Reference: Annual Reports 1999-2006 of The Wharf (Holdings) Limited
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Figure 7 Revenue and Operating profit of MTL, 2001-2006
Reference: Annual Reports 1999-2006 of The Wharf (Holdings) Limited
MTL launched a new company logo in early December 1999 to meet the
challenges of the new millennium. The turnover for 1999 was HK$10,520.5
million, as compared with HK$10,839.7 recorded in 1998. On the
background of continued strong consumer demand in the USA and some
improvements in the Intra Asia trade, container volumes showed
satisfactory growth during 1999. Throughput volumes at container
terminals to and from the South China region, including Hong Kong,
registered an overall growth of 12.6 per cent equivalent to over 1.3 million
twenty-foot-equivalent units (TEUs). Hong Kong ports attracted almost 40
per cent of this growth. Modern Terminals handled a total of 2.60 million
TEUs in 1999, up 9.6 per cent over 1998. (The Wharf (Holdings) Limited,
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1999) At the end of 1998, Modern Terminals was committed to
participating in the development of the Container Terminal 9 (CT9) project
in Hong Kong.
In 2001, Modern Terminals’ profitability was maintained at 2000’s level
with an increased throughput of 4.7 per cent over a year ago and
productivity gains of almost 12 per cent. In February 2001, The Wharf
(Holdings) Limited increased its shareholding in Modern Terminals to 55.3
percent from 50.8 percent. A leading operator of value-added container
terminal services in the South China region, Modern Terminals maintained
its profit at 2000’s level due to increased market share and enhanced
productivity. Since 1997, the average cost per TEU handled has been
reduced by as much as 50 per cent, and staff productivity in terms of TEUs
per headcount increased to 2,985 from 1,525, representing a productivity
gain of almost 100 per cent. Despite the mild drop in Kwai Chung’s
throughput volume in 2001, Modern Terminals maintained its trend of
persistent growth since 1998. (The Wharf (Holdings) Limited, 2001)
Modern Terminals handled 3.61 million TEUs in 2002, which was 2.7 per
cent higher than 2001’s record performance. With continuous investment in
hardware, software and human resources, Modern Terminals’ container
handling capacity expanded by more than 4 per cent, to 4.2 million TEUs,
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by the end of 2002. TEUs per headcount, one of the main productivity
benchmarks, also improved to 3,072 from 2,985. At the end of 2002,
Modern Terminals’ market share in Kwai Chung remained more or less
unchanged at about 30 per cent. (The Wharf (Holdings) Limited, 2002)
The number of container boxes handled by Hong Kong’s Kwai Chung
terminal grew by 1.2 per cent in 2003, compared with 5.2 per cent growth
the year before. Notwithstanding the uncertainties provoked by the
implementation of the US Government’s Container Security Initiative
requirements, the Middle East military conflict and the SARS outbreak,
Modern Terminals handled around four million TEUs during 2003,
representing a year-on-year growth of more than 10 per cent – far above the
Kwai Chung average. Modern Terminals’ market share in Kwai Chung
expanded to 33.1 per cent from 30.3 per cent in 2002. The delivery to
Modern Terminals of the four berths at Container Terminal 9 in Hong Kong
began in October 2003. The revenue of Modern Terminals increased in
2003 as a result of a growth in throughput handled, mainly driven by strong
feeder and transhipment volume. Operating profit of Modern Terminals
also improved satisfactorily despite the keen competitive environment of
the terminal industry in South China. (The Wharf (Holdings) Limited, 2003)
In 2004, Modern Terminals handled 4.35 million TEUs in Kwai Chung,
nine per cent higher than the record four million TEUs achieved in 2003.
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Driven by continually strong export growth, the South China region
registered an overall increase of 19 per cent or 3.96 million TEUs in total
volume of containers handled. Modern Terminals’total throughput for 2004
increased by 9.1 per cent or 362,000 TEUs compared with that of 2003.
This was mainly driven by feeder, transhipment and intra-Asia volume.
During 2003, operating cost increased because of the increased volume of
activities and higher depreciation charges incurred due to the introduction
of CT9. Despite the continuous improvement in productivity, the increase
in operating cost slightly affected the company’s operating profit. With
continuous investment in hardware, software and human resources, Modern
Terminals’ productivity continued to improve in 2004. At the end of 2004,
Modern Terminals’ market share remained at about one-third of the total
market in Kwai Chung. (The Wharf (Holdings) Limited, 2004)
In 2005, Throughput at Modern Terminals grew by 16 percent to 5.04
million TEUs in 2005, driven mainly by feeder, trans-shipment and intra-
Asia volume. Having taken delivery of four CT9 berths in 2004, Modern
Terminals operated 7.5 berths with a total handling capacity of 5.88 million
TEUs. Modern Terminals’total revenue and operating profit increased by 6
percent and 5 percent respectively in 2005 on the back of significant
throughput growth. (The Wharf (Holdings) Limited, 2005)
99
In 2006, concerning the Container Terminal business in Hong Kong,
despite a 7 percent throughput growth, Modern Terminals’ revenue and
operating profit decreased by 2 percent and 4 percent respectively in 2006,
as a result of box mix shift in favour of trans-shipment and feeder cargos,
and increasing competition in Hong Kong and South China. Performance in
the first half was particularly soft with only marginal throughput growth.
(The Wharf (Holdings) Limited, 2006)
Conclusive Remark
Most often, the business regarding to Container Terminal is only part of the
affairs of large corporations, the performance of their Container Terminal
therefore may not be illustrated in details in their Annual Reports due to the
simplicity reason. Hence, only two operating companies’ business reviews
were available. Nevertheless, it can be still clearly denoted that Container
Port industry in Hong Kong is healthy and well-operated. As indicated in
the Annual Reports of COSCO Pacific Limited and The Wharf (Holdings)
Limited, the business performance of Container Terminals operated by
COSCO-HIT and MTL are improving over years. In recent years, with the
increasing investment in advanced technology and facilities, the
competitiveness of Hong Kong Container Port in global market is still being
maintained.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CYBERPORT: PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
BACKGROUND
Cyberport, Hong Kong’s IT Flagship, is a US$2 billion (HK$15.8 billion)
landmark project managed by Hong Kong Cyberport Management
Company Limited and wholly owned by the Government of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). The project was being
developed on a 24-hectare site at Telegraph Bay in the southern district of
Hong Kong Island. It comprises four office buildings, a five-star hotel (Le
Méridien Cyberport Hotel), a retail entertainment complex (The Arcade)
and a deluxe residential development (Residence Bel-Air), aiming at
creating an interactive environment that will be home to a strategic cluster
of about 100 IT companies and 10,000 IT professionals.
The vision of Hong Kong Cyberport is establishing a leading information
technology hub and digital city of the Asia-Pacific region. It aims to create
a strategic cluster of quality IT and IT related companies critical to the
development of Hong Kong into a leading digital city in the region; to
nurture and support the development of small and medium IT enterprises as
an essential constituent of such a strategic cluster; to provide a state-of-the-
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art infrastructure conducive to the creation of such a strategic cluster and its
development; to develop a regional centre of excellence for IT and digital
media training for creating human capital in IT through collaboration and
partnership with the industry, academia, and research institutes and
professional bodies; to spearhead the development of the digital media
industry through the provision of hardware, software and technical support
in the Digital Media Centre; and to promote the development of services
and applications for wireless and mobile communications leveraging on
Cyberport's excellent infrastructure and synergy.
HISTORICAL REVIEW OF CYBERPORT18
1999: Proposal of Cyberport by Hong Kong Government
The development of Cyberport was announced by Financial Secretary Sir
Donald Tsang in his budget speech on 3rd March 1999. To meet the
challenges of the 21st Century, the Government believed that it must adapt
to the new forces of the Information age and respond to the mega trends of
technological advances. Hence in March 1999, the Government proposes to
develop a $13 billion Cyberport in Telegraph Bay, Pokfulam, in Hong
18 The Information in this section is based on the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region Government Press Release and the minutes of Legislative Council Information
Technology and the Progress Report on Cyberport Project released by Information
Technology and Broadcasting Panel.
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Kong providing the essential infrastructure to form a strategic cluster of
information services companies. These companies would specialize in the
development of services and multi-media content to support businesses and
industries ranging from financial services, through trading, advertising and
entertainment to communications. In the speech of Financial Secretary of
HKSAR, it was mentioned that Hong Kong had an edge in developing
information technology and must look for a development in this area which
would upgrade the existing economic activities, create new products, and
expose them to the electronic world market. And Hong Kong must race
against time to have a quick and decisive response in developing its own
position in view of the speed with which the information technology sector
was advancing and the emphatic efforts of practically all of competitors in
trying to carve out their own corners of the market.
It was believed by the Government that the Cyberport would generate more
than 12,000 jobs in Hong Kong. Some 4,000 jobs would also be created in
the construction industry while it was being built. Also, it would generate
demand for support services such as accounting, legal and other back-office
functions. Most important, the Cyberport would provide quality products to
upgrade the current economic activities and enable people to reach out to
the limitless cyber market. Meanwhile the Government had set up a special
Task Force to review our immigration policy critically to facilitate the
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inflow of talent. In particular, the Task Force would consider how best to
remove restrictions on scientists and highly-skilled technologists from the
Mainland entering Hong Kong to work hoping that it would help to quickly
widen the pool of potential talent and the supply of quality people who
could help to realize the vision of Cyberport. The pool of talent would also
enhance competitiveness and promoting the development of technology-
based industries.
The Government said that the Cyberport development would have to rely
largely on the expertise and entrepreneurial spirit of the private sector as
only the market knows what is needed for it to flourish and it would not be
right for the Government to design and construct it on its own. Most of the
$13 billion investment would come from private investment. (Hong Kong
Government Press Release, 3 March 1999)
1999: Corporation with Pacific Century Group (PCG)19
The Cyberport project, a 24-hectare waterfront project, was awarded to the
Pacific Century Group (PCG) in 1999 without a formal tender process for
the development, but instead the Government proceeded into detailed
19 The information in this section is based on the Information Technology and
Broadcasting Panel. December 2000. Progress report of the cyberport project. Hong
Kong: Information Technology and Broadcasting Bureau.
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discussions with the company from whom the idea originates. The
Government then was alleged that the Cyberport project was a deal aimed
at favouring the (PCG). In response to the scandal, the Government
explained that development of an attractive Cyberport would require
partnership with leading-edge information technology and services
companies. However, these companies do not normally enter into large
scale property development, let alone a tendering process for such
development. PCG was one company which was willing to take on the risks
and act as the anchor tenant. Secondly, the Government found that they
need to move quickly to compete with other emerging information and
telecommunication centres as it hoped to develop Hong Kong into a leading
IT and services centre. It was claimed that a tendering process would cause
delay and not necessarily produce the desired results. Thirdly, PCG was
able to help market the Cyberport to the target tenants by first, becoming an
anchor tenant through its joint venture with Intel and getting other leading
IT and services companies to become anchor tenants.
The Government said that under the present arrangement, they can be
assured of a quality development, minimum Government outlay, and firm
interest from the preferred information technology and services companies
to move in as anchor tenants. It was also stated that the Cyberport project is
105
a strategic infrastructure project and not a property development. In terms
of hardware, the project provided intelligent buildings, the best
telecommunications and information infrastructure, shared IT facilities for
tenants. In terms of software, it created a critical mass of talents which only
top IT companies could provide. The Government explained that the
property development associated with the Cyberport was only a means to
achieve this outcome and added that companies without a strong IT
background would not be able to meet fully the Cyberport requirements.
PCG, as co-developer and anchor tenant, designed, constructed and funded
the development. The Government is the sole owner of the Cyberport
including the land, the buildings and the facilities thereon and receives the
entire rental from the Cyberport. This meant the developer met the full
construction cost, and took on the commercial risks. Its only source of
profits was from the ancillary residential development which was claimed
by the Government to be necessary to help finance the project. Profits were
shared between PCG and the Government on residential development, but
before that $200 million was set aside for a Cyberport Development Fund.
The return to the developer depended on the construction cost, the value of
the land, sale prices of the flats and the mode of financing. Under the
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assessment of Information Technology and Broadcasting Bureau, the return
would be less than that achievable in normal property developments. Also,
it was clarified by the Secretary for Information Technology and
Broadcasting that the plot ratio of the ancillary residential development was
between 3 and 4. The current figure is 3.8. The Government was also
prepared to sell its share of equity interest in the residential development to
third parties who may be interested. (Hong Kong Government Press
Release, 16 March 1999) The Government is responsible for providing the
necessary infrastructure for the Cyberport. Between May 1999 and
December 2000, the Finance Committee approved funding totalling some
$1.1 billion for the following works:
(a) Provision of roads, drains and the essential infrastructure for the
Cyberport development;
(b) Construction of the northern access road and associated drains and
waterworks; and
(c) Extension of water supply to Pok Fu Lam areas.
2000: Cyberport Project Agreement20
After 8-month discussion with Pacific Century Group (PCG), the
Government signed the Cyberport Project Agreement, on 17 May 2000,
20 The information is this section is mainly based on the Hong Kong Government Press
Release. 17 May 2000. Government, pccw enter into cyberport project agreement.
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with Pacific Century CyberWorks (PCCW) and Cyber-Port Limited, a
special purpose vehicle (SPV) wholly-owned by PCCW to perform the role
of Cyberport Developer i.e. to design, construct, develop and market the
Cyberport Portion and the Residential Portion as an integrated development
in accordance with the Project Agreement. The Project Agreement was
signed by the three limited companies set up by the Government to
implement the Cyberport project. They are the Hong Kong Cyberport
Development Holdings Company Limited and its two subsidiaries
functioning as SPVs, Hong Kong Cyberport Management Company
Limited and Hong Kong Cyberport (Ancillary Development) Company
Limited. These companies are wholly-owned by the Financial Secretary
Incorporated (FSI). The Developer was required to hand back the
completed Cyberport Portion to the FSI companies while the units in the
Residential Portion were to be put on sale in the open market.
The Project Agreement provided a legally binding contract for the whole
project period which lasted from the commencement of the construction of
the Cyberport in mid-2000 to the sale of all units in the Residential Portion
up to mid-2007 covering detailed issues relating to construction, financing
arrangements, sales of residential units, application of the sales proceeds,
intellectual property rights, and so on. The Project Agreement clearly set
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out clearly the Government controls and PCG’s obligations in all aspects.
(Appendix 9)
Figure 8 Contractual Arrangement of Cyberport Project
Reference: Cyberport News 2000
The Project Agreement was consistent with the Letter of Intent (LOI) that
the Government signed with Pacific Century Group in 1999. It set out the
detailed arrangements for the development of the Project and contained
adequate safeguards to protect the interest of the Government and that of
the general public. The Development Right was granted by the FSI
Government
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Hong Kong Cyberport Development Holdings Ltd. (HKCD) * #
Developer – Cyberport Limited * PCCW –
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Right Hong Kong Cyberport Management
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Hong Kong Cyberport Management
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*Companies which signed the Project Agreement on 17 May 2000
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companies, upon the receipt of the conditions precedent specified in the
Project Agreement, such as receipt of the Cashflow Guarantee and
acceptance of the concept design, etc.
The Residential Portion Land Value was assessed to be $7.80098 billion by
the Lands Department on the date of the grant of the Development Right. It
was told by the Information Technology and Broadcasting Bureau that the
figure of $7.80098 billion was the open market value of the land earmarked
for the Residential Portion as at the date of the grant of the Development
Right to the Developer on 8 June 2000. This premium of $7.80098 billion
reflects an accommodation value of $20,780 per square meter. The
Residential Portion Land Value $7.8 billion already included the estimated
cost of $1.1 billion for infrastructural works.
The Residential Portion Land Value was used in determining Government’s
equity contribution to the Cyberport project for the purpose of calculating
Government’s share of surplus sales proceeds under the Project Agreement.
It was expected that both parties would recover their respective
contributions from sharing the surplus sales proceeds after the sales
proceeds have been applied to meet other agreed project expenses. (Hong
Kong Government Press Release, 3 August 2000, 17 May 2000)
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2000: Commencement of the construction of the Cyberport21
Infrastructural Works
In the Cyberport project, the infrastructural works mainly comprised
advance ground treatment works, construction of a public transport
interchange, a sewage treatment plant and roadworks including a southern
access road connecting the southern end of the site with Victoria Road.
These works were entrusted to Carlyle International Limited, a company
within Pacific Century Group (PCG), and were monitored by the Territory
Development Department (TDD). A northern access road was planned to be
built to connect the northern end of the Cyberport site with Sha Wan Drive
by end 2003 to coincide with the target completion date of the third phase
of the Cyberport development. To meet this timetable, TDD awarded a
separate contract to China Harbour Engineering Co. in October 2000.
Superstructure Construction
The overall design had largely been finalized by 2000. The Cyberport
Portion itself was to be completed in three phases, from end 2001/early
2002 to end 2003, ahead of the Residential Portion which was scheduled for
completion in five phases between mid 2004 to mid 2007.
21 The information in this section is based on Information Technology and Broadcasting
Panel. December 2000. Progress report of the cyberport project. Hong Kong:
Information Technology and Broadcasting Bureau.
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Office Tenants
As at 5 December 2000, over 200 companies (“interested companies”)
registered interest in becoming tenants at the Cyberport. Fifteen of them,
namely Cisco, CMGI, Hewlett-Packard, Hikari Tsushin, Hua Wei, IBM,
Legend, Microsoft, Oracle, Pacific Convergence Corporation, Portal,
Silicon Graphics, Softbank, Sybase, and Yahoo! have signed letters of
intent to become anchor tenants. Through informal meetings and
questionnaires, information from the interested companies about their
business plans at the Cyberport had been collected. About one third of the
interested companies had indicated some preliminary space requirements.
Their total indicative space requirements slightly exceed the 112,100m2
which was planned to provide at the Cyberport. The Cyberport was aimed
to accommodate over 150 companies of a full spectrum, ranging from
multinational corporations, large overseas and local companies to medium
and small sized local and overseas companies that specialize in applications
of information technology and in the development of services and
multimedia content to support businesses and industries in Hong Kong.
There were some preliminary admission guidelines. The focus was on the
information technology and information services sectors. Companies which
use or introduce new, leading-edge applications of information technology
would be given most favourable consideration. Priority would also be given
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to companies which provide services to enhance traditional services
delivery e.g. distant learning, securities trading and multimedia film
production; provide essential services in support of global or regional
business e.g. software development; utilize the Cyberport as a hub of the
global information infrastructure e.g. corporate information network or
customer service network. (Information Technology and Broadcasting
Panel, December 2000)
2001: Cyberport under progress 22
Cyber-Port Limited is responsible for the provision and procurement of
funds to meet the project expenses until proceeds are collected from the sale
of the units in the residential development to meet the outstanding project
expenses. As at the end of December 2001, Cyber-Port Limited already
spent more than $1.6 Billion on the project.
Infrastructural Works & Superstructure Construction
They were under progress. Design work for the Cyberport was completed in
2001 and the construction of the buildings was still in progress. As to the
22 The information in this section is based on ________. July 2001. Progress of the
cyberport project. Hong Kong: Information Technology and Broadcasting Bureau.
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residential development, design work was already at an advanced stage, and
piling foundation for the first phase commenced in 2001.
Master Layout Plan (MLP)
According to the current Master Layout Plan, which was approved by the
Town Planning Board in January 2001, the Cyberport (excluding the
neighbouring residential development) would provide a total of 112,100m2
of office space (92,600m2 in the previous MLP), 29,000m2 of commercial
space (27,600m2 in the previous MLP), 12,000m2 for the development of a
hotel and 8,100m2 for quality housing development. It was originally
proposed in the previous MLP that 144 residential flats (of 19,500m2) were
to be provided by end 2002. In response to Members’ request for provision
of more office space, this area were converted to office use, and
accommodated some 25 extra IT companies by end 2002.
Office Tenants
The Committee on Admission of Cyberport Office Tenants was set up in
March in 2001. The response to the invitation for application for Cyberport
office tenancy was positive. As at end June, a total of 54 applications from
multinational, overseas and local companies had been received. These 54
applicants altogether sought about 78,000 m2 lettable floor area, accounting
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for 88 percent of the total lettable floor space (88,000m2) in all the phases
of the Cyberport scheduled for completion between early 2002 and end
2003. Quality IT companies started moving into the Cyberport from early
2002 which brought with them professionals from all parts of the world.
(Information Technology and Broadcasting Panel, July 2001)
2002: Completion of Phase CI (Cyberport 2),
CIB (part of Cyberport 3) and CII (Cyberport 1) 23
The Cyberport is made up of four office buildings (respectively named
Cyberport 1, 2, 3 and 4), a five-star hotel and a retail and entertainment
complex. It was being completed in phases to provide a total of 94,100 sq m
of lettable office space.
Phase CI (Cyberport 2) was completed in April 2002 to provide a total of
18,000 sq m office space, Phase CIB (part of Cyberport 3) was completed
in August 2002 to provide 1,500 sq m office space and accommodate the
Cyberport Visitor Centre (which was officially opened on 27 June 2003)
and Phase CIA (Cyberport 1) was completed in November 2002 to provide
a total of 15,400 sq m of office space;
23 The information in this section is based on ________. February 2002. Progress of the
cyberport project. Hong Kong: Information Technology and Broadcasting Bureau.
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Office Tenants
It was found in 2002 that 78 companies were interested to move into the
various phases of the Cyberport development. These 78 companies
altogether have applied for a total of 82,237m2, which accounts for 94
percent of the total lettable floor area (of 87,500m2) at the different phases
of the Cyberport.
Cyberport Arcade Leasing
Leasing of the 166,000 sq. ft. of retail space at the Cyberport Arcade was
guided by a three-prong strategy, namely, an Arcade theme to guide tenant
recruitment, the Anchor-Tenant (A-T) approach to secure a core set of retail
outlets, and incentives that were essential to attract retail merchants to the
shopping centre. Discussion was conducted with at least four substantive
proposals from these prospects and one viable proposal was short-listed by
the Agent after a 12-month process. Negotiation with the short-listed
candidate ensued and an initial A-T agreement was signed in late 2002.
(Information Technology and Broadcasting Panel, February 2002)
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2003: Completion of Phase CII (part of Cyberport 3) 24
Phase CII (part of Cyberport 3) was completed in February 2003 to provide
20,100 sq m office space and part of the shared facilities. Although the
ancillary residential development was completed in phases between
September 2004 and mid-2008 while Phase R1a (Residence Bel-Air) and
R1b were still under construction in 2004, pre-sale of Phase Residence Bel-
Air (R1a) (544 units) was launched in February 2003. As at end June 2003,
over 95 percent of the units were sold. Pre-sale of Phase R1b (about 300
units) was also took place in the fourth quarter of 2003.
The Cyberport Institute, run by the University of Hong Kong, started
operation in September 2003. In cooperation with six corporate partners,
the Institute offers post-graduate and professional diploma courses in areas
such as IT project management, networking and multi-media technology.
Institutional Arrangements
On 5 June 2003, the Hong Kong Cyberport Management Company Limited
appointed 10 non-government directors, including the Chairman, to its
Board for a two-year term. The new Board, comprising a broad spectrum of
experience and expertise in the relevant fields, will continue to direct the
24 The information in this section is based on ________. July 2003. Progress report on
the cyberport project. Hong Kong: Information Technology and Broadcasting Bureau.
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Company in accordance with prudent commercial principles within the
overall objectives and guidelines set by the Government for Cyberport.
PCCW was originally planned to be the management company of both the
residential and residential blocks, the right to manage the non-residential
blocks was deprived due to complaints over conflicts of interest as PCCW
was assigned the development and management rights without proper
tenders, sparking widespread criticism among local developers.
At its meeting on 20 June 2003, the Board set up a committee to recruit a
Chief Executive Officer and a Director (Campus & Project Management) to
replace the Cyberport Coordinator and the Deputy Director (Construction &
Development) whose secondment to the Cyberport Companies expires on 4
January 2004.
Transportation
The Cyberport is being served by four bus routes and a Green Mini Bus
route, namely, Route M49 to/from Central; Route 73 to/from Stanley;
Route 970P to/from So Uk Estate, Route 107P to/from Hunghom and GMB
Route 69 from Quarry Bay via Causeway Bay. The number of morning
express bus services running between Central and Cyberport direct has been
increased during the past six months.
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Tenancy
As at 10 July 2003, 24 companies and organizations have leased or
committed to lease office premises in the Cyberport. Seven of them,
including one based in Shenzhen, are new companies in Hong Kong. 97
percent of Phase CI, all the space in CIB, 65 percent of CIA and 26 percent
of CII have been taken up. The aggregate take-up rate for Phases CI, IA and
IB is about 80 percent.
2004: Completion of Phase CIII (remaining part of Cyberport 3)
and Phase CIV (Cyberport 4) 25
Phase CIII (remaining part of Cyberport 3) was completed in April 2004 to
provide 31,900 sq m office space and part of the shared facilities and Phase
CIV (Cyberport 4), a three-storey office building (7,700 m2), was
completed in late 2004. The Arcade (formerly known as the Cybercentre)
and the Cyberport hotel run by the Le Meridien Group, was opened in early
2004 and in spring 2004 respectively.
One of the major shared facilities located in the “IT Street” of the Cyberport
included a well-equipped Digital Media Centre (DMC) to provide one-stop
25 The information in this section is based on ________. December 2004. Report on the
cyberport project. Hong Kong: Information Technology and Broadcasting Bureau.
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facilities and technical support to digital media content creators in Hong
Kong. Other facilities provided in the “IT Street” to support Cyberport
tenants’ operations included a Wireless-solutions Development Centre, an
iResource Centre, a business centre, meeting and training rooms.
Office Leasing and Marketing
All applications for Cyberport tenancy were considered and approved by
the Committee on Admission of Cyberport Office Tenants. The Committee,
which comprised international and local experts, considers applications
having regard to the business profile of the applicant and its relevance to the
objectives of the Cyberport.
As at 15 June 2004, 28 companies and organizations (including two new
tenants since our last report to the Panel) have leased or committed to lease
Cyberport offices. The 28 tenants took up 71 percent of the space in
Cyberport 1, 97 percent of the space in Cyberport 2, and 17 percent of
Cyberport 3. The aggregate take-up rate for these three completed buildings
was about 43 percent.
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Financial Arrangement
As at end May 2004, Cyber-Port Ltd, the Developer, has contributed around
$4.372 billion to the Cyberport project. After deducting the relevant
expenses due and payable and contributing to a Development Maintenance
Fund for up-keeping the Cyberport, surplus proceeds from the sale of the
residential units will be shared between the Government and PCCW
according to their respective contribution to the Project. The proceeds
generated from the pre-sale of Phases RI and III (part) of the Residential
Portion are being used to finance the outstanding construction costs of
Cyberport and the residential development with part of the proceeds
transferred to the Development Maintenance Fund.
PERFORMANCE OF CYBERPORT
Before evaluating the performance of Cyberport, ones should have a clear
mindset that the entire Cyberport development consists of two subsidiaries,
namely, the Cyberport Portion and Residential Portion. (Appendix 20) The
former involved the development of 94,100-square-meter offices, a five-star
hotel (Le Méridien Cyberport Hotel) and a 27,000-square-meter retail and
entertainment complex (The Arcade). They are wholly owned by the
Government and the entire rental from the Cyberport Portion is received by
the Government. On the other hand, the Residential Portion is jointly owned
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by the Government and PCCW, hence the profit derived from the sale of
residential units would be shared between them according to their
respective capital contributions in this project.
Figure 9 Cyberport Portion and Residential Portion at Cyberport
The government’s capital contribution to the project was the Residential
Portion Land Value of the Cyberport, valued at HK$7.93 billion, which
included an estimated cost of about HK$1.10 billion for the basic
infrastructure. PCCW was responsible for the construction costs of both the
Cyberport portion and the residential portion.
Opportunity Cost of Cyberport
Before investigating the business performance of the existing developments
in Cyberport, the opportunity cost of Cyberport is to be taken into
consideration so as to understand how much had been forgone for this large
project.
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The ancillary residential development (Bel-Air), being the brand new sea-
view residences in Pokfulam, its sale revenue was found to be great.
According to the Transaction Data Bank of Ricacorp Properties Limited,
the transacted unit price of Bel-Air as at 2 Jan 2008 was ranged between
HK$8,357 and $15,440 per sq. ft. It was then believed that the best
alternative use of whole site of Cyberport would be residential development.
If the entire 24-hectare site was used to develop high rise residential
buildings with high quality at the plot ratio of 3.8 times, the GFA of the
entire site of Cyberport would be,
240,000 x 3.8 = 912,000 m2
Using the accommodation value assessed by the Lands Department in 2000
(20,780 per m2), the land value of the entire site of Cyberport would be,
912,000 x 20,780 = HK$18,951,360,000 (18.9 bn)
It is about 2.4 times the value being attributed by the government to its
stake (HK$7.8bn) in the Cyberport. This then is the opportunity cost of the
Cyberport, less any gains that may accrue to the government from its
development and future rental.
Residential Portion (jointly owned by PCCW and Government)
The Residential Portion of Cyberport is an ancillary development. The
capital contribution by the Government to the Project is the Residential
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Portion Land Value at the time when the development right was granted to
the Cyberport Developer, which was HK$7.93 billion including the
estimated cost of HK$1.10 billion for the basic infrastructure. The capital
contribution of the Developer was the funding it provided to finance the
construction costs and related expenses of the project which was HK$4.36
billion.
Table 6 Capital contribution of PCCW and Hong Kong Government
HK$ billion Percentage
Government’s contribution of Land 7.93 64.5 percent
PCG’s contribution of capital 4.36 35.5 percent
Total equity 12.29 100 percent
The surplus proceeds from the sale of the residential units, after deducting
reserve funds as well as the relevant expenses due and payable are shared
between the Government and the Developer according to the respective
capital contributions (Government – 64.5 percent and Developer – 35.5
percent). The first distribution of surplus proceeds was made in 2004.
In June and September 2005, the Government received the second and third
distributions of the surplus proceeds totalling about $1.33 billion out of a
total distribution of $2.06 billion. The total cumulative surplus distribution
received by the Government to-date is about $3 billion. (Information
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Technology and Broadcasting Panel, April 2006) According to the
transaction data bank of Centaline Properties Agency Limited, the unit price
of Residence Bel-Air is found to be the highest among the luxury
residential developments located around with the average unit price
HK$12,783 while that of Chi Fu Fa Yuen and Baguio Villa are HK$5,709
and HK$7,563 respectively. (Appendix 11-13)
Based on the latest forecast by the Developer, the total amount of surplus
proceeds that should be available for distribution up to 2010, including
$4.65 billion distributed to date, is estimated to be around $20 billion, from
which the Government’s share should be around $12.9 billion in total,
including $3 billion already received to date. It should be noted that the
actual amount of surplus proceeds available for distribution and hence the
Government’s share will vary depending on the actual sales prices of the
remaining residential units. (Office of the Government Chief Information
Officer Commerce, March 2007)
The Hong Kong Cyberport Development Holdings Limited reported a profit
of HK$817 million in 2005/06 compared with a profit of HK$1,134 million
in 2004/05 and a loss of HK$159 million in 2003/04. The profit in 2004/05
and 2005/06 has mainly been contributed by Project Income from ancillary
residential development and it is expected to continue until around 2009/10.
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Cyberport Portion (solely owed by Government)
Despite of the fact that the Cyberport Portion is a Government-owned asset,
the financial accounts of Cyberport Portion have never been disclosed to
public after its official completion on 28 June 2004. For this reason, a
request had been made by phone on 28 December 2007 for the annual
reports of Cyberport. The Senior Customer Services Officer of Cyberport
Facilities Management Office, Miss Tiontee Lo, replied that the Hong Kong
Cyberport Management Company Limited (HKCM) refused to disclose
their annual reports. Upon the conversation on phone and the replied email,
they claimed that that they have the rights not to publicize the financial
accounts because HKCM is neither a listed company nor a governmental
department.
“As per our previous conversation, due to the Hong Kong Cyberport
Management Company Limited is not the listed company, I am afraid that it
is inconvenience (inconvenient) for us to disclose the annual report to
public.” (Appendix 16)
Without the official financial accounts of the Hong Kong Cyberport
Management Company Limited, the business performance of Cyberport
office, The Arcade and the Le Méridien Cyberport Hotel can only by
evaluated in the basis of the information available in the press release,
126
minutes of the legislative council consisting the Report of Cyberport Project
and financial statements of Hong Kong Cyberport Development Holdings
Limited26 (Appendix 19).
Office
Cyberport commenced operation in 2002 with the admission of the first
office tenant. According to the financial statements of Hong Kong
Cyberport Development Holdings Limited, the rental income27 of the whole
Cyberport project increased from HK$33,007,796 in 2004 to
HK$40,252,375 in 2005 while in 2006, it reached to HK$51,619,036.
However, such rental income consists of those from both Residence Bel-Air
and Cyberport office, in other words, the independent financial account for
Cyberport office is not shown. Therefore the money investment return of
Cyberport office is unable to be recognised.
For this reason, the occupancy rate is to be used as the second indicator for
investigating the performance of Cyberport Office. In February 2005, the
26 Hong Kong Cyberport Management Company Limited is one of subsidiaries of the
Hong Kong Cyberport Development Holdings Company Limited.
27 Rental income is one of the components of total turnover of Cyberport Project. Others
include management fee income, income from hotel operation, car park fee income,
information technology facilities income, fees for usage of DMC and IRC equipment ad
services, broadband service and installation fees and other incidental income.
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occupancy rate of Cyberport was only 42 percent. (Hong Kong Government
Press Release, 1 November 2007) As at 6 December 2006, it grew to 75
percent with 96 tenants, including 30 incubate companies. (Mak, 2006) As
indicated in the Press Release released by the HKSAR Government on 1
November 2007, the occupancy rate further increased to 87 percent. The
increasing occupancy rate implied that the financial state of Cyberport
office is generally improving. Nevertheless, the average monthly rent,
including management fess, was HK$ 20 per square foot in December 2006
which was far behind the average HK$77 per square feet net effective rents
for Grade A office space recorded in Central in the third quarter of 2006,
according to Savills Valuation and Professional Services. (Mak, 2006) Such
low-rent practise would amount to intervention in the rental market and
tempt some of companies to strive to define themselves as suitably I.T.-
driven in order to qualify for lower rents in this area. As at 31st March 2006,
it was recorded that 46 multinational and local offices committed to be
tenants in Cyberport office. (Appendix 10)
Le Méridien Cyberport Hotel
Income from hotel operation was witnessed in an increasing trend, growing
from HK$51,601,223 in 2005 to HK$79,792,117 in 2006.
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Table 7 Extracted Financial Statement of Hong Kong Cyberport
Development Holdings Limited
Reference: Report on the Cyberport Project (March 2007),
Information Technology and Broadcasting Panel
Nevertheless, according to the Hong Kong Hotel Rates (01-29 February
2008) issued by H.I.S. (Hong Kong) Company Limited, the unit pricing rate
of Le Méridien Cyberport is relatively low among the five-star hotels
situated in Hong Kong Island. The unit pricing rate of single occupancy and
twin/ double occupancy in Le Méridien Cyberport is HK$1,120 while the
average unit pricing rate of the five-star hotels situated in Hong Kong
Island is HK$2,472. In other words, the Le Méridien Cyberport charges
only half of the market unit pricing rate of a standard five-star hotel.
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Table 8 Unit pricing rate of 5-star hotels in Hong Kong Island in 2008
Hotel Name Single occupancy Twin/ double
occupancy
1. Landmark Mandarin
Oriental
HK$3,020 HK$3,020
2. Le Méridien Cyberport HK$1,120 HK$1,120
3. Mandarin Oriental HK$2,500 HK$2,500
4. Four Seasons Hotel
Hong Kong
HK$2,770/
HK$3,720
HK$2,770/
HK$3,720
5. Grand Hyatt HK$2,320-
HK$3,020
HK$2,320-
HK$3,020
6. Island Shangri-La HK$2,500-
HK$2,690
HK$2,500-
HK$2,690
7. Regal Hong Kong HK$1,080-
HK$1,680
HK$1,080-
HK$1,680
Reference: H.I.S. (Hong Kong) Company Limited
The Arcade
It is recorded in the Report on the Cyberport Project released by the
Information Technology and Broadcasting Panel in March 2007 that the
first retail tenant in the Arcade started operation in 2004. (Information
Technology and Broadcasting Panel, March 2007) In 2007, 84 percent of
the lettable retail space in the Arcade has been let or occupied and there
were fourteen tenants including the Anchor Tenant. In order to verify this
statement, a site visit of The Arcade has been paid on 13 July 2007 and 11
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March 2008. In the first visit, surprisingly, it was realized that there were
very few shoppers in The Arcade and the restaurants were full of spare
tables and chairs. Indeed, not even one consumer could be seen in some
restaurants during lunch-time! In the Open Food Court located at level 4 of
The Arcade, there were two people taking their seats and reading
newspapers without making any order of food or beverage. This deserted
condition seemed to be slightly improved in the second visit conducted on
11 March 2008 in the evening. There are more consumers enjoying their
dinner in some restaurants, however, there were no doubts that the
unoccupied dinning area still dominated.
Upon the two site visits, it was realized that among all the retailers having
their business in The Arcade, other than food and beverage, the number and
occupying area of both property agencies and shops providing wedding
services dominated over others, but again, no matter what kinds of shops
they were, it was hard to see shoppers inside. Furthermore, quite a lot of
vacant shops were discovered in The Arcade especially at Level 2 and 4.
Some photos had been taken in the visits for better illustration. (Appendix
14 and 15)
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Conclusive Remark
In spite of the profit recorded (HK$817,486,402) by the Hong Kong
Cyberport Development Holdings Limited in March 2006, this has mainly
been contributed by the project revenue generated from the Residence Bel-
Air. Since the financial statements of Hong Kong Cyberport Management
Company Limited cannot be obtained, evaluating the business performance
of Cyberport Portion (Cyberport office, The Arcade and Le Méridien
Cyberport) in terms of the revenue and profit is not possible. Hence, the
occupancy rate and unit rent of Cyberport office, the unit pricing rate of Le
Méridien Cyberport and the on-site observation in The Arcade has formed
the basis of the evaluating indicators.
The unit rates of Cyberport office and Le Méridien Cyberport are indeed
below the market rate while the lettable retail space in The Arcade has not
reached its full capacity. Most important, the shopping area in The Arcade
is greatly under usage. Overall speaking, the business performance of the
Cyberport office, The Arcade and Le Méridien Cyberport in Cyberport
Portion are lagged behind the Residence Bel-Air in Residential Portion. A
land value of 18.9 billion has been forgone by the Government for the
Cyberport project, so ones would certainly have a very high expectation on
Cyberport. However, it cannot be denied that Cyberport is still a
disappointment to date.
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CHAPTER FIVE
REASONS OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF TWO PORTS
Upon the historical review, it is realized that the development of two ports,
Container Port and Cyberport, has involved the participation of both private
sectors and the Government, but they represent two very different outcomes
resulted from the Government participation in a laissez faire economy.
Although both private sectors and Government have played roles in two
ports, the planning and development of Container Port is indeed driven by
market. Therefore, it would be seen as a kind of planning by market. On the
other hand, the planning of Cyberport is recognised to be under the
government-interventionist approach. The reasons of the Container Port’s
success and the Cyberport’s failure are discussed as follows.
CONTAINER PORT
Global Trend of Containerization
As stated in the literature review of the containerization, the container
revolution began on 26 April 1956. However, the growth of
containerization was blocked by the plethora of container shapes and sizes
in 1965. This problem was solved by the international approval of standard
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sizes after 1966. Different parties involved in the container industry reached
compromises since then, international container shipping truly started after
1966. This global trend of containerization spread to Hong Kong as well.
Before the containerization concept was being developed by Malcom
McLean and extensively applied in the industry in 1966, the port
development in Hong Kong was found to be rather slow. As reviewed in the
previous section on historical development of Hong Kong Container Port,
although several schemes for port development were suggested in the early
twentieth century, they were not effectively implemented due to various
reasons. In 1924, a plan concerning development of wharves and godowns
in various locations had been devised. However, it was taken no action
because it was not proved that to be necessary and due to the financial
stringency following in that period. In early 1941, a report on the “Future
Control and Development of the Port of Hong Kong” was compiled, but
they were only realized after many years following the return of peace from
Japanese occupation.
In 1948, first strategic plan for Hong Kong was formulated reflecting a
number of suggestions which includes constructing an industrial/ port
development zone connected with railway and additional wharves and
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reclamation. Yet, due to the sudden influx of refugees from China and the
United Nations embargo on trade the plans were shelved.
Until in the 1960s, when containerization concept was gathered momentum
throughout the world and container ships began introduced on scheduled
shipping routes between the U.S.A. and Western Europe, the Container
Committee was immediately set up by the Government in 1966 as
developing Hong Kong into a Container Port was inevitable. Since then, the
shipping of goods become less cost and less complicated due to the usage of
highly automated system for moving goods. Later, the container port
industry boosted throughout the world, and Hong Kong was one of the
coastal cities which greatly benefited from the introduction of
containerization. It was not just because Hong Kong has been gifted with a
deep harbour, but also the flourishing industrial development during 1960s
to 1970s. According to Levinson (2006), the industrial sectors in Hong
Kong was at advantage since the cost of bringing raw materials in and
sending finished goods out had decreased drastically. The widespread of
containerization concept had pushed Hong Kong to be a Container Port.
Hong Kong had no choice to avoid this since a global market had been
created and appeared in front of the domestic logistic companies through
international container shipping.
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Government Participation in Forward Moving Industry
In the 1940s to 1960s, the trade of the port was mainly handled in
conventional ways at mid-stream buoys and at privately owned and
operated wharves, until in mid 1960s, the Government participation in the
port development was realized. The Container Committee, which was set
up in 1966 and mainly consisted of private sectors, suggested that the
Government investment in Container Port development was necessary, but
the container operator must have full control of operations throughout
container movement. It implied that the Government at that time acted as a
coordinator rather than an active player in the port industry. However, such
involvement of Government was essential. Without the solid basis provided
by the Government, the progress was believed to be slow, because the
industry tended not to abandon its existing bases.
Also, the Kwai Chung Container Terminal was built when the port industry
was already an existing, powerful and forward moving industry. Such
powerful port industry was born from the introduction of containerization
concept and also the increasing foreign trade of the PRC in 1971 after the
U.S. President Richard Nixon lifted the 20-year old trade embargo from the
PRC. They could be interpreted as the market forces driving the Container
Port to be developed. Although the Kwai Chung container terminal was
completed in 1976 after the stock market crash in 1973, the Oil Crisis and
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the world economic recession in 1974 ad 1975. It had the capacity to handle
up to equivalent of 1.5 million 20-foot containers a year and was then
ranked the fourth largest in the world and the second largest in Asia. Hence,
the Government participation in constructing Kwai Chung Terminal in
1970s was evaluated to be a correct coordination at right timing.
Other major Government involvement in Container Port industry was
realized in 1980s after the Open Policy in China. The drastic increase of
transactions between Hong Kong and China pushed the Government to
make plans for a second site for container terminal. Subsequently in 1982,
the Government concluded a substantial expansion of the Container Port in
Kwai Chung area and future expansion off south-eastern Tsing Yi Island
are the two port development possibilities. In 1984 Territory Development
Strategy (TDS) was completed by Government, including provisions for
development of additional container terminals at Kwai Chung. Moreover, in
the same year, the government completed negotiation with the Hongkong
International Terminals (HIT) to build Terminal Six.
Upon the completion of the Port and Airport Development Strategy (PADS)
study since 1989, the HKSAR government started playing an important role
in the coordination of the port development process to ensure that Hong
Kong’s port development can keep up with the times and global
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development, and can maintain a competitive position. Overall speaking,
the Government participation in the development of Container Port industry
was coordinating in nature and at a time when Container Port industry
appeared to be powerful and forward moving.
CYBERPORT
Domination of Residential Development
According to the land value of the Cyberport residential portion assessed by
Lands Department in 2000, the land was worth $7.80098 billion with the
accommodation value of $20,780 per m2. The gross flood area (GFA) of the
residential portion can be calculated by using the following formula.
2m375,408AreaFloorGross
AreaFloorGross
000,980,800,7780,20
AreaFloorGross
ValueLandValueionAccommodat



Since the plot ratio of this development was 3.8, the site area of residential
portion can then be calculated by using the following formula.
Gross Floor Area = Site Area x Plot Ratio
375,408m2 = Site Area x 3.8
Site Area of residential portion = 98,781 m2
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The site area of residential portion is more than one-third of the total
development site area of the Cyberport project. According to the Progress
Report on the Cyberport (January 2004), a total of 91,100m2 of lettable
office space was provided. The GFA of the residential portion, when
compared with the lettable office space, was found to be 4 times of the
lettable office space.
Table 9 GFA of different portion in Cyberport Project
Sections Sq. m
Residential Portion 375,408
Retail and entertainment complex (The Arcade) 27,000
Grade A Offices 94,100
Being a centre with the vision to be a leading information technology hub
and digital city of the Asia-Pacific region, the necessity of such large
amount of residential development was in doubt. It was criticised by some
public bodies that “Cyberport” is indeed a “Cyber Villas”. (Webb-site.com,
1999) The domination of real estate development has hindered the
Government to achieve the ultimate mission of Cyberport i.e. to create a
strategic cluster of quality IT and IT related companies because it in fact
reduced the available area designated for I.T. excellence. It was hard to
explain the existence of a luxury housing development in an area which was
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originally designed for clustering I.T. companies except for its great profit-
generating power which was favoured by PCG.
Misinterpretation of Silicon Valley by Hong Kong Government28
It is quite obvious that the Cyberport is meant by the Government to be our
Silicon Valley since the rise of Silicon Valley seemed to offer the
possibility that a region with no prior industrial history could make a direct
leap to a leading-edge industrial economy with the presence of right set of
circumstances. For the purpose of evaluating whether Cyberport can
perform the same as the Silicon Valley in the United States, it is
prerequisite to get a basic idea of the nature of Silicon Valley and how it
came to be.
Silicon Valley is located in the southern part of the San Francisco Bay Area
in Northern California in the United States. This term initially referred to a
region with large number of silicon chip innovators and manufacturers, but
it is now generally used to represent a high-technology sector.
28 The information in this section is based on Sturgeon, T. J. 2000. Understanding
silicon valley: Anatomy of an entrepreneurial region: How silicon valley came to be.
Edited by Martin Kenney: Stanford University Press. and Webb-site.com. Cyber villas
by the sea. http://www.webb-site.com/articles/cybervillas.htm.
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History of Silicon Valley
The San Francisco Bay Area had long been a major site of U.S. Navy
research and technology. In 1909, Charles Herrold started the first radio
station in the United States in San Jose. Later that year, Stanford University
graduate Cyril Elwell purchased the U.S. patents for Poulsen arc radio
transmission technology and founded the Federal Telegraph Corporation
(FTC) in Palo Alto. Over the next decade, the FTC created the world’s first
global radio communication system, and signed a contract with the U.S.
Navy in 1912.
In 1933, a number of technology firms had set up shop in the area around
Moffett to serve the Navy. When the Navy gave up its airship ambitions
and moved most of its West Coast operations to San Diego. NACA (the
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, forerunner of NASA) took
over portions of Moffett for aeronautics research. Many of the original
companies stayed, while new ones moved in. The immediate area was soon
filled with aerospace firms such as Lockheed.
In 1953, William Shockley left Bell Labs in a disagreement over the
handling of the invention of the transistor. Shockley moved to Mountain
View, California in 1956, and founded Shockley Semiconductor Laboratory.
Shockley believed that silicon was the better material for making transistors
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and intended to replace the current transistor with a new three-element
design, but the design was considerably more difficult to build than the
“simple” transistor. In 1957, Shockley decided to end research on the
silicon transistor. As a result, eight engineers left the company to form
Fairchild Semiconductor and two of the original employees of Fairchild
Semiconductor went on to found Intel.
By the early 1970s there were many semiconductor companies in the area.
The growth of Silicon Valley was fuelled by the emergence of the venture
capital industry on Sand Hill Road, beginning with Kleiner Perkins in 1972;
the availability of venture capital exploded after the successful $1.3 billion
IPO of Apple Computer in December 1980. Although semiconductors are
still a major component of the area’s economy, Silicon Valley has been
most famous in recent years for innovations in software and Internet
services. Silicon Valley has significantly influenced computer operating
systems, software, and user interfaces.
Cyberport is no Silicon Valley29
As realized in the history of Silicon Valley, it was founded with the
academic support of nearby Stanford and UCLA Berkeley, but not simply a
29 The information in this section is based on Webb-site.com. Cyber villas by the sea. http://www.webb-
site.com/articles/cybervillas.htm.
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Government intention of developing an area of I.T. excellence. Areas of I.T.
excellence were developed principally through high quality educational
institutions and a good quality of life for the people who work there.
Therefore, Hong Kong cannot develop an area of I.T. excellence unless the
Government focused its effort on upgrading the educational and physical
environment.
Furthermore, numerous modern office blocks with fully digital telephone
system and fibre optic lines can be found over the territory. If the I.T.
companies need spaces and technological support such as modern offices,
high-speed data lines, they can get it easily at a reasonable cost. The private
sector would also be very delighted to provide additional spaces for these
companies through open tender process for the land. Therefore, the demand
for an area of I.T. excellence is indeed quite low in Hong Kong. What I.T.
businesses perhaps need most is sufficient numbers of potential employees
with an education in information technologies. Their needs can be satisfied
by increasing the Government spending on tertiary and secondary education,
fostering private investment in training, research and development and
making Hong Kong an attractive place to live for immigrant professionals.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
In short, the role of Government engaged in the development of Container
Port and Cyberport determined their success and failure. In the Container
Port development, the Government acted as a good coordinator who has
given supports to private container operators since 1960s when the concept
of containerization had been appreciated and adopted world-widely. The
contribution by Malcom McLean on reshaping the marine business through
introducing the containerization concept had imposed benefit to Hong Kong
Container Port development and led the private sectors take the initiatives
to urge the Government to be involved in the container industry. In other
words, the development of Container Port industry in Hong Kong was
driven by market force. During the development process of Hong Kong
International Container Terminal, the Government has acted as a good
coordinator of the private sectors, for instance, the shifting away from the
historic cargo handling methods and centres to modern containerization was
being pushed by both the industry itself and the Government. It was found
to be the start of the success of the Container Port industry.
Contrasting to Container Port, Cyberport has been developed mainly under
the initiation by Government. Although it was claimed that the idea of
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Cyberport was originated from PCG, the Government indeed took the
active role since the start of this project. Also the developments in
Cyberport Portion are all under the Government’s control and management.
There is no doubt that the planning of Cyberport was under the government
interventionist approach. The mission of developing Hong Kong’s Silicon
Valley possibly is a good idea, but unfortunately, it has not been achieved
because area of I.T. excellence cannot be founded by a simple Government
intention, but the sufficient academic support and talented people in the
territory. The failure of the Government planning of Cyberport is thus
concluded to be the misinterpretation of the Silicon Valley.
All in all, the Government is recommended to be a coordinator instead of an
initiator of a large development in a laissez faire economy.
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Appendix 1
Weights and dimensions of the most common types of containers worldwide
20' container 40' container 45' high-cube container
imperial metric imperial metric imperial metric
length 19' 10½ " 6.058 m 40′ 0″ 12.192 m 45′ 0″ 13.716 m
width 8′ 0″ 2.438 m 8′ 0″ 2.438 m 8′ 0″ 2.438 m
external
dimensions
height 8′ 6″ 2.591 m 8' 6″ 2.591 m 9′ 6″ 2.896 m
length 18' 10 5⁄16″ 5.758 m 39' 5 45⁄64″ 12.032 m 44′ 4″ 13.556 m
width 7' 8 19⁄32″ 2.352 m 7' 8 19⁄32″ 2.352 m 7' 8 19⁄32″ 2.352 m
interior
dimensions
height 7' 9 57⁄64″ 2.385 m 7' 9 57⁄64″ 2.385 m 8' 9 15⁄16″ 2.698 m
width 7' 8 ⅛ ″ 2.343 m 7' 8 ⅛ ″ 2.343 m 7' 8 ⅛ ″ 2.343 m
door aperture
height 7' 5 ¾ ″ 2.280 m 7' 5 ¾ ″ 2.280 m 8' 5 49⁄64″ 2.585 m
volume 1,169 ft³ 33.1 m³ 2,385 ft³ 67.5 m³ 3,040 ft³ 86.1 m³
maximum
gross mass 52,910 lb 24,000 kg 67,200 lb 30,480 kg 67,200 lb 30,480 kg
empty weight 4,850 lb 2,200 kg 8,380 lb 3,800 kg 10,580 lb 4,800 kg
net load 48,060 lb 21,600 kg 58,820 lb 26,500 kg 56,620 lb 25,680 kg
Reference: Wikipedia website
Appendix 2
Operators of Container Terminals
Reference: Wikipedia website
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Appendix 3
Ownership Structure of Container Terminals in 1980s
Modern Terminal Limited (MTL)
Terminal 1: built by the Modern Terminal Limited (MTL) which was
originally owned by three of its user shipping lines and five of Hong
Kong’s leading British business firms: Overseas Containers Limited, Ben
Line Containers Limited, and Hapag Loyd AG as well as Swire Pacific
Limited, Hutchison International Limited, the Hongkong Bank, Jebsen and
Company and Sir Elly Kadoorie Continuation Ltd. Construction started in
December 1970 and finished on February 9, 1972 at a cost of HK$154
million.
Terminal 5: built by MTL in Novermber 1975. In 1980, Sir Yue-Kong
Pao, a local Chinese, paid HK$2.1 billion to buy control of Wharf
Holdings from Hong Kong Land (a subsidiary of Jardine Matheson) and
therefore MTL began to be controlled by local Chinese capital.
Terminal 2: built by a Japanese firm (Oyama Shipping) and was later
brought by the Hongkong International Terminals (HIT), jointly owned by
Whampoa and China Provident, at a cost of HK$175 million. In 1988,
MTL took over the right of developing Terminal 2 to swap its right in
developing Terminal 6.
Sea-Land Orient Limited (SLOT)
Terminal 3: owned by US-capital Sea-Land Orient, a U.S. Corporation.
Hong Kong International Terminals Limited (HIT)
Terminal 4, 6 and 7: built and operated by the Hongkong International
Terminal since the 1980s. HIT services about 2,500 ships a year and its
container yard handles about 8,000 container movements a day –
providing a total of 10 of Kwai Chung’s fifteen berths. HIT is a private
sector undertaking with shareholders such as Hutchison Whampoa, the
Hongkong Bank, China Resources, Orient Overseas Holdings, Mitsui
OSK, and Dao Heng Nominees.
Reference: Ng (1992)
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Appendix 4
Ownership Structure of Container Terminals in 2007
Terminal Operator Depth(m) Berths
Quay
length
(m)
Quay
cranes
Area
(m²)
Terminal 1
(CT1) MTL 14 1 4
Terminal 2
(CT2) MTL 14 1 5
Terminal 3
(CT3) DPI 14 1 305 6 167,000
Terminal 4
(CT4) HIT 12.5 3 8
Terminal 5
(CT5) MTL 14 1 4
Terminal 6
(CT6) HIT
12.5-
15.5 3 11
Terminal 7
(CT7) HIT 15.5 4 15
Terminal 8 East
(CT8E) HIT/COSCO 15.5 2 640 9 300,000
Terminal 8 West
(CT8W) ACT 15.5 2 740 8 285,000
Terminal 9
North (CT9N) HIT 15.5 2 700 9 190,000
Terminal 9
South (CT9S) MTL 15.5 4 1,240 13 490,000
Reference: Wikipedia website
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Appendix 5
Company Structure of China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company
Reference: homepage of China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company
Container
leasing
China Ocean Shipping (Group)
Company
COSCO Container
Lines Company
Limited
China COSCO
Holdings Company
Limited
Independent
Shareholders
Terminal and
related business
Logistics Container
manufacturing
and other
investments
100% 63.83%
51.34% 48.66%
COSCO-HIT
Terminals (CHT)
Limited
50%
COSCO Pacific
Limited
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Appendix 6
Hong Kong Container Terminal 3
Terminal Capacity Over 1.2 million TEUs in record
Terminal Size 16.7 Hectares (167,000m2)
Berth Information 1 Berth
305 Meters of total berthing
14 Meters water depth
Channel Depth 14.5 m
Distance 2 kilometres (30 minutes) from sea-buoy
Reference: homepage of Asia Container Terminals Ltd
Appendix 7
Hong Kong Container Terminal 8 (West)
No. of Berth 2
Quay Length 740m
Water Depth 15.5m
Terminal Area 28.54 hectares (285,400 m)
Stacking Capacity 34,818 TEUs
Shore Cranes 8 (24-row wide)
Rubber Tyred Gantry Cranes 20
Gate Lanes 14 (In & Out)
Reefer Points 740
Distance between Bollards 50ft
Distance between Fenders 50ft
Reference: homepage of Asia Container Terminals Ltd
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Appendix 8 Hong Kong Container Terminals 4, 6, 7, 8 (East) and 9
Facilities Terminals 4, 6 & 7 Terminal 8 East Terminal 9
Total Area (hectares) 92 30 19
Ship Berths 10 2 2
Barge Berths 4 5-Apr 5-Apr
Ship Berth Length
(ft) 9,797 2,099 2,296
(m) 2,987 640 700
Barge Berth Length
(ft) 1,000 1,469 984
(m) 305 448 300
Minimum Depth Alongside
(ft) 41.0 - 51.0 51 51
(m) 14.2 - 15.5 15.5 15.5
Reference: homepage of HIT
Appendix 9 Hong Kong Container Terminal 1,2,5,9 (South)
Annual Throughput 5,400,000 TEUs
Annual Capacity 7,000,000 TEUs
Number of Container Berths 7
Number of Feeder Berths 2
Total Area 92.61 ha (228.75 acres)
Length of Berths 2,322 m (7,618 ft)
Minimum Depth Alongside * 15.5 m (50.8 ft)
Stacking Capacity 85,000 TEUs
Reference: homepage of MIT
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Appendix 10
Further Explanation of profit after income tax of
COSCO-HIT Terminal Limited, 1999-2006
Structure of Share Issue of COSCO Pacific Limited in 2004
Place of
establishment/
operation
Principal
activities
Paid-up capital Percentage interest
in ownership/
voting power/ profit
sharing
2004 2003
Hong Kong Operation of
container
terminal
2 “A” ordinary
shares of HK$ 10
each
2 “B” ordinary
shares of HK$10
each
50%/
50%/
50%
50%/
50%/
50%
Reference: COSCO Pacific Limited Annual Report 2004
Structure of Share Issue of COSCO Pacific Limited in 2005
Place of
establishment
/ operation
Principal
activities
Paid-up capital Percentage
interest in
ownership/
voting power/
profit sharing
2006 2005
Hong Kong Operation of
container
terminal
2 “A” ordinary shares
of HK$ 10 each
2 “B” ordinary shares
of HK$10 each
4 non-voting 5 percent
deferred shares of
HK$10 each
50%/
50%/
50%
50%/
50%/
50%
Reference: COSCO Pacific Limited Annual Report 2005
In 2005, “non-voting 5 percent deferred shares of HK$10 each” was being
issued, with the number of these shares equal to the total number of the
existing A and B ordinary shares. It was observed that such issuance
imposed certain changes on the financial statements of COSCO-HIT
Terminal Limited in 2004 which is shown in the following table.
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Appendix 10
Further Explanation of profit after income tax of
COSCO-HIT Terminal Limited, 1999-2006 (Cont’d)
Extracted Financial statements of
COSCO-HIT Terminal (Hong Kong) Limited in 2004
Reference
Non-
current
assets
Current
assets
Non-
current
liabilities
Current
liabilities Revenue
Profits
after tax
Annual
Report
2004
306,654 38,910 (277,244) (20,157) 128,426 63,545
Annual
Report
2005
153,327 19,455 (138,622) (10,079) 64,213 31,773
Reference: COSCO Pacific Limited Annual Report Annual Report 2004 and 2005
The financial statement of COSCO-HIT Terminal (Hong Kong) Limited in
2004 had been presented in both the Annual Report 2004 and Annual
Report 2005, but the figures are greatly different. It can be seen that all the
figures shown in Annual Report 2005 are half those in Annual Report 2004.
Therefore it is believed that the issuance of non-voting 5 percent deferred
shares since 2005 explained this significant difference. For the purpose of
better presentation of the trend of the profit after tax of COSCO-HIT
without the impact of issuance of non-voting 5 percent deferred shares, the
hypothetic profit after income tax from 1999 to 2004 is being made as
follows.
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Appendix 10
Further Explanation of profit after income tax of
COSCO-HIT Terminal Limited, 1999-2006 (Cont’d)
Profits after income tax vs. hypothetic profit after income tax
Year Profits after income tax(US$ '000)
Hypothetic profit after income tax
(US$ '000)
1999 58,627 29,314
2000 60,602 30,301
2001 58,462 29,231
2002 69,746 34,873
2003 61,829 30,915
2004 63,545 31,773
2005 27,981 -
2006 23,751 -
Reference: COSCO Pacific Limited Annual Report 2000-2006
Profit after income tax of COSCO-HIT Terminal Limited, 1999-2006
Reference: COSCO Pacific Limited Annual Report 2000-2006
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Appendix 11
Summary of Cyberport Project Agreement in 2000
- The Project is owned by the Government (through the three FSI-owned
companies set up for undertaking the Project). The land and all the
Intellectual Property (IP) already created or to be created for the Project
are absolutely owned by the FSI companies;
- PCG should bear all the constructions risks by guaranteeing to the FSI
companies that the Project will be constructed in accordance with the
pre-approved design and specifications, according to the pre-agreed
timetable and at a fixed price. The fixed price is $15.8 billion at the
Money of Day (MOD) Prices, and the Developer will pay any cost
overrun from its own resources (as a PCCW Expense);
- PCG should take on all the financing risks. Before sales proceeds are
made available to meet the project expenses, PCG should make capital
contribution to the Project out of its own resources and/or raise Project
Level Debt. In any case, the Developer will need to provide an ongoing
six-monthly cashflow guarantee in advance at any point in time
throughout the Project;
- PCG should procure the sale of the Residential Portion in accordance
with the arrangements to be approved by the FSI companies, but the
sales proceeds should be held in an “A” rated bank and managed by an
independent Security Trustee strictly in accordance with the prescribed
manner and order;
- PCG should protect the interests of the FSI companies by providing an
extensive range of guarantees, warranties undertakings and indemnities;
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Appendix 11
Summary of Cyberport Project Agreement in 2000 (Cont’d)
- An extensive range of events of default are included in the Project
Agreement, such as insolvency, non-payment, and any breach of other
obligations under the Project Agreement. The Developer is required to
remedy its breaches within the specified grace periods out of its own
resources (as a PCCW Expense) and to reimburse the FSI companies for
any cost/loss incurred as a result of its breaches (again as a PCCW
Expense). If any of the breaches is not remedied by the Developer within
the specified period, the FSI companies may terminate the Project
Agreement; and
- PCG should pay a range of expenses (e.g. the Developer's tax, the cost
of providing the six-monthly cashflow guarantee, and cost of its capital
contribution) out of PCG's own resources.
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Appendix 12
Office List of Committed Tenants as at 31st March 2006
1. GXS International Inc. A multinational company providing
network and data centre infrastructure for
B2B e-Commerce services globally.
2. Microsoft (Hong Kong)
Ltd
A multinational company and a leading
software provider. It has recently acquired
one more floor in Cyberport (in addition to
the two floors leased earlier) to meet
expansion needs.
3. ESRI (Hong Kong)
China
A U.S. based company providing
Geographical Information System products.
4. IT Technology Centre
Ltd (formerly Incubation
Centre at Cyberport
Limited)
A local company providing incubator
services for IT industry.
5. PCCW A H.K. listed company providing
international, local and mobile telecom
services, Internet and interactive
multimedia services.
6. Outblaze Limited A local company. Development and
outsourcing provider of web-based
communication and infrastructure software
solutions.
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Appendix 12
Office List of Committed Tenants as at 31st March 2006 (Cont’d)
7. SafeNet Asia Limited
(formerly Rainbow
Technologies (Asia
Pacific) Co. Ltd)
A U.S. company new to Hong Kong. It
provides information security solutions for
Internet, eCommerce and content
protection.
8. The University of Hong
Kong
For setting up of “Cyberport Institute” to
provide research and training facilities on
site.
9. Compuware (Asia
Pacific) Limited
A U.S. based company providing software
tools and professional services for business.
10.Hong Kong CSL Limited A local company providing telecom and
mobile services.
11.Sybase Hong Kong
Limited
A multinational company providing
technical services on business development
and application solution development.
12.HNH International Ltd A Hong Kong based international company
engaging in the production and marketing
of classical and world music (including
brand names like Naxos and Marco Polo),
audio-visual programs, online music and
language education, webcasting and book
publishing.
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Appendix 12
Office List of Committed Tenants as at 31st March 2006 (Cont’d)
13.Arctic Cooling (HK) Ltd. A Switzerland based company and new to
Hong Kong. It provides thermal solutions to
reduce the noise and heat of computer
systems.
14.Centro Digital Pictures
Ltd.
One of the leading local companies
dedicated to digital animation creations for
applying onto film, video and other multi-
media production.
15.Office of the
Government Chief
Information Officer
(formerly Information
Technology Services
Department, HKSAR)
A Government body of the HKSAR, which
is mainly responsible for monitoring of
technology trend, appraising and
monitoring new technologies and solutions
on IT, providing management and facilities
support for IT training, and management of
IT services and projects.
16.Shenzhen Strength A PRC based software company new to
Hong Kong. Its software products apply to
intelligent residential building system,
remote utility meters reading, CATV
broadband network.
17.Schneider Electric
Business Solutions –
SEBS HK Ltd.
A French-based multinational corporation.
The Hong Kong office serves as its IT hub
and platform to enhance its global customer
service, administration as well as other
value-added services.
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Office List of Committed Tenants as at 31st March 2006 (Cont’d)
18.EO Global Ltd. A small size local company focusing on the
research and development of software
products in connection with global
relocation of personnel, executive search
and other human resources management
tools.
19.EmployeeConnect
(Greater China) Ltd.
A local SME company backed by an
Australian company engages mainly in the
development and marketing of its software
product – “EmployeeConnect”, which
performs a comprehensive range of web-
based functions on corporate human
resources and administration matters.
20.CoVi Technologies Inc. A U.S. company new to Hong Kong. Its
principal business is design, development
and manufacturing of IT-friendly digital
and HDTV video surveillance hardware and
software systems.
21.Brightex Technology
Ltd.
A small size local company specializing in
the development and marketing of software
products in connection with mobile devices
such as PDAs, mobile phones and tablet
PC.
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Office List of Committed Tenants as at 31st March 2006 (Cont’d)
22.Rockwell Automation
Asia Pacific Ltd.
A wholly owned subsidiary of Rockwell
Automation, a listed company in U.S. The
company provides integrated automation
solutions to enhance industrial productivity
of its clients by means of advanced
technologies.
23.Adel Group (Asia) ltd
(formerly Hong Kong
Ideal Group Limited)
A PRC based company specializes in
research and development, marketing and
sales of biometrics access products for IT
security applications.
24.eDesiCool Limited (trade
name under GeoClicks)
A local SME company engaging in online
B2C e-commerce activities. It currently
manages 3 websites and affiliates with
Amazon.com and Google.com.
25.Societe D Applications
Technologiques Del
Imagerie Micro-onde
(Local registered name
for Satimo (SA) Societe
D’Applications
Technologiques De
L’Imagerie Micro-ondes)
A French company new to Hong Kong and
focusing on design and manufacture of
electromagnetic waves measurement
systems apply to wireless application
device.
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Office List of Committed Tenants as at 31st March 2006 (Cont’d)
26.Evolution World Wide A newly set up local company engages in
research and development of anti-spam
system.
27.Centanet Company
Limited
A wholly owned subsidiary of Centaline
(Holdings) Co. Ltd., a leading local real
estate consultancy firm. The company
principal business is design, develop and
maintain a local property portal website as
well as an integrated web-based GIS
mapping system – “Centamap.com”, which
is widely popular.
28.Flying Cam S.A. A Belgium company new to Hong Kong
and specializes in close range aerial filming
with unmanned helicopter for TV
broadcast, movie industry and homeland
security.
29.Founder Development
Ltd (trade name under
HyperNet)
A local company specializing in software
development in connection with customer
relation management, enterprise resources
planning application and e-commerce.
30.Adtio Group Limited A local company specializing in software
development for mobile, wireless and radio
frequency identification application.
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Office List of Committed Tenants as at 31st March 2006 (Cont’d)
31.Typhoon Games (HK)
Limited
A local games development company and
one of its patented products is the “Hello
Kitty” series.
32.CSL Cosmos Solutions
Ltd
A local company specializing in software
development for mobile data applications
applicable to forwarder, transportation,
warehousing and logistics business trade.
33.Swiss Reinsurance
Company, Hong Kong
Branch
A Swiss reinsurance company and
Cyberport serve as its IT hub for Asia as
well as their regional e-learning and
training centre.
34.Qualicom Innovations
(Asia) Ltd
A Canadian software development and
consultant company new to Hong Kong.
The company specializes in the
development of enterprise software
applications using J2EE and .NET
technologies.
35.Hong Kong Polytechnic
University
For setting of “Multimedia Innovation
Centre of School of Design” which focuses
in technology commercialization, research
and development, training and creative IP
development in the field of digital
multimedia and entertainment creation.
164
Appendix 12
Office List of Committed Tenants as at 31st March 2006 (Cont’d)
36.Eurosport Asia Limited A French company new to Hong Kong. The
company specializing in production,
broadcasting and distribution of sports
audiovisual programs. It reaches more than
98 million households in 54 countries
across Europe.
37.Regal Cyber Limited A local company specializing in software
and hardware development for biometrics
and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
application.
38.Asia Petroleum
Investment Co. Ltd.
A PRC based company focuses in the
research and development of Non-linear
Parallel Processing System known as XEC
III Controller, which is an innovative
solution for off-shore oil reserves
exploration and detection. The company
also intends to establish a network system
at Cyberport offering the said technology to
international network providers.
39.Hong Kong Education
City Limited
Operate under the Education Manpower
Bureau (EMB) of the Government of
HKSAR and provide a one-stop education
portal which serves as an e-learning and e-
business platform for students, teachers and
parents.
165
Appendix 12
Office List of Committed Tenants as at 31st March 2006 (Cont’d)
40.Famous Joy International
Limited
A newly set up local company specializing
in the creation of digital content, animation
and special effects.
41.Energy Saving Solutions A newly set up local company specializing
in the development of LED control
software products apply to energy saving
and efficiency for LED lighting.
42.Clear Channel
Entertainment HK
Productions Ltd
A UK based company new to Hong Kong
and specializes in web-based ticketing and
event promotion as well as mobile
broadcasting of entertainment programs and
events.
43.AsiaABS Limited A newly set up local company engages in
web delivered solutions for financial
services and in particular, focuses on Asset
Backed Securities (ABS). The company
also develops proprietary software products
in Chinese and Thai language.
44.Hong Kong Productivity
Council
For setting up “Hong Kong Digital
Entertainment Industry Support Centre” to
provide industrial support in relation to
animation, entertainment software and
visual effects.
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Office List of Committed Tenants as at 31st March 2006 (Cont’d)
45.Globe 7 HK Limited A subsidiary of an Indian based telecom
services company, Northgate Technologies
Limited who launches the first globally
patented SIP VoIP phone. The company is
a new set up in Hong Kong.
46.RealEyes 3D Asia
Pacific Ltd
A French company new to Hong Kong
specializes in design, develop and
distribution of embedded applications and
mobile devices.
Reference: Report on the Cyberport Project (April 2006)
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Transaction data of Baguio Villa
Latest Transactions Transaction Date Area Unit Price
A Middle Floor BLOCK 24
BAGUIO VILLA 5 Mar 2008 1020s.f. $7,480
C Lower Floor BLOCK 24
BAGUIO VILLA 5 Feb 2008 1520s.f. $8,520
Middle Floor BLOCK 33
BAGUIO VILLA 16 Jan 2008 1590s.f. $8,491
C Upper Floor BLOCK 19
BAGUIO VILLA 10 Jan 2008 1520s.f. $10,197
B Middle Floor BLOCK 19
BAGUIO VILLA 2 Jan 2008 1020s.f. $7,892
B Lower Floor BLOCK 26
BAGUIO VILLA 2 Jan 2008 1135s.f. $5,991
B Middle Floor BLOCK 22
BAGUIO VILLA 9 Dec 2007 1020s.f. $7,451
Reference: homepages of Centaline Properties Agency Limited
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Transaction data of Chi Fu Fa Yuen
Latest Transactions Transaction Date Area Unit Price
C Middle Floor FU YAN
YUEN (BLOCK 8) CHI FU
FA YUEN
4 Feb 2008 694s.f. $5,303
H Middle Floor FU HENG
YUEN (BLOCK 11) CHI FU
FA YUEN
31 Jan 08 518s.f. $5,270
G Upper Floor FU YIP
YUEN (BLOCK 9) CHI FU
FA YUEN
28 Jan 08 694s.f. $5,879
D Middle Floor FU HO
YUEN (BLOCK 5) CHI FU
FA YUEN
22 Jan 08 518s.f. $5,985
E Upper Floor FU YIP
YUEN (BLOCK 9) CHI FU
FA YUEN
21 Jan 2008 518s.f. $5,382
D Lower Floor FU WAH
YUEN (BLOCK 10) CHI FU
FA YUEN
11 Jan 2008 518s.f. $4,151
B Upper Floor FU YIP
YUEN (BLOCK 9) CHI FU
FA YUEN
5 Jan 2008 694s.f. $5,764
E Upper Floor FU YAR
YUEN (BLOCK 12) CHI FU
FA YUEN
31 Dec 2007 518s.f. $6,023
D Middle Floor FU YIP
YUEN (BLOCK 9) CHI FU
FA YUEN
20 Dec 2007 518s.f. $4,556
Reference: homepages of Centaline Properties Agency Limited
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Transaction data of Residence Bel-Air
Latest Transactions Transaction Date Area UnitPrice
B Upper Floor TOWER 5
PHASE 3 - BEL-AIR ON
THE PEAK RESIDENCE
BEL-AIR
3 Mar 2008 2438s.f. $15,997
B Middle Floor TOWER 7
PHASE 6 - BEL-AIR NO. 8
RESIDENCE BEL-AIR
5 Feb 2008 939s.f. $13,299
B Upper Floor TOWER 7
PHASE 6 - BEL-AIR NO. 8
RESIDENCE BEL-AIR
18 Feb 08 939s.f. $12,886
B Middle Floor TOWER 1
PHASE 6 - BEL-AIR NO. 8
RESIDENCE BEL-AIR
15 Feb 08 595s.f. $14,286
B Middle Floor TOWER 2
PHASE 3 - BEL-AIR ON
THE PEAK RESIDENCE
BEL-AIR
13 Feb 08 912s.f. $12,445
A Middle Floor TOWER 5
PHASE 6 - BEL-AIR NO. 8
RESIDENCE BEL-AIR
13 Feb 08 1560s.f. $13,998
A Upper Floor TOWER 2
PHASE 1 RESIDENCE BEL-
AIR
1 Feb 2008 1399s.f. $12,580
C Upper Floor TOWER 3
PHASE 6 - BEL-AIR NO. 8
RESIDENCE BEL-AIR
1 Feb 08 1551s.f. $14,094
B Upper Floor TOWER 6
PHASE 1 RESIDENCE BEL-
AIR
30 Feb 2008 1455s.f. $12,234
B Lower Floor TOWER 5
PHASE 1 RESIDENCE BEL-
AIR
29 Jan 2008 1682s.f. $13,436
B Upper Floor TOWER 2
PHASE 3 - BEL-AIR ON
THE PEAK RESIDENCE
BEL-AIR
29 Jan 2008 895s.f. $13,966
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Transaction data of Residence Bel-Air (Cont’d)
Latest Transactions Transaction Date Area UnitPrice
C Upper Floor TOWER 6
PHASE 3 - BEL-AIR ON
THE PEAK RESIDENCE
BEL-AIR
22 Jan 2008 1724s.f. $13,503
A Middle Floor TOWER 6
PHASE 1 RESIDENCE BEL-
AIR
21 Jan 2008 1679s.f. $13,103
B Lower Floor TOWER 5
PHASE 3 - BEL-AIR ON
THE PEAK RESIDENCE
BEL-AIR
21 Jan 2008 2367s.f. $14,998
A Upper Floor TOWER 2
PHASE 1 RESIDENCE BEL-
AIR
21 Jan 2008 1322s.f. $17,247
A Middle Floor TOWER 2
PHASE 3 - BEL-AIR ON
THE PEAK RESIDENCE
BEL-AIR
21 Jan 2008 1708s.f. $13,232
B Upper Floor TOWER 3
PHASE 1 RESIDENCE BEL-
AIR
18 Jan 2008 1502s.f. $11,917
A Middle Floor TOWER 9
PHASE 3 - BEL-AIR ON
THE PEAK RESIDENCE
BEL-AIR
14 Jan 2008 1408s.f. $9,801
C Upper Floor TOWER 8
PHASE 3 - BEL-AIR ON
THE PEAK RESIDENCE
BEL-AIR
11 Jan 2008 1379s.f. $11,603
B Upper Floor TOWER 1
PHASE 3 - BEL-AIR ON
THE PEAK RESIDENCE
BEL-AIR
9 Jan 2008 912s.f. $13,114
C Middle Floor TOWER 6
PHASE 3 - BEL-AIR ON
THE PEAK RESIDENCE
BEL-AIR
9 Jan 2008 1724s.f. $12,877
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Transaction data of Residence Bel-Air (Cont’d)
Latest Transactions Transaction Date Area UnitPrice
B Upper Floor TOWER 6
PHASE 3 - BEL-AIR ON
THE PEAK RESIDENCE
BEL-AIR
8 Jan 2008 913s.f. $11,829
A Lower Floor TOWER 5
PHASE 3 - BEL-AIR ON
THE PEAK RESIDENCE
BEL-AIR
5 Jan 08 2346s.f. $13,640
A Upper Floor TOWER 6
PHASE 3 - BEL-AIR ON
THE PEAK RESIDENCE
BEL-AIR
31 Dec 2007 2817s.f. $15,797
A Upper Floor TOWER 7
PHASE 6 - BEL-AIR NO. 8
RESIDENCE BEL-AIR
28 Dec 2007 1594s.f. $13,802
B Upper Floor TOWER 2
PHASE 3 - BEL-AIR ON
THE PEAK RESIDENCE
BEL-AIR
24 Dec 2007 895s.f. $12,067
B Upper Floor TOWER 1
PHASE 3 - BEL-AIR ON
THE PEAK RESIDENCE
BEL-AIR
21 Dec 2007 895s.f. $12,291
Reference: homepages of Centaline Properties Agency Limited
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Photos shot at Cyberport on 13 July 2007
The Arcade
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Photos shot at Cyberport on 11 March 2008
The Arcade
Cyberport Office Le Méridien Cyberport Hotel
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Email Reply from Cyberport
Dear Ms Chan,
Thank you for your email. As per our previous conversation, due to the
Hong Kong Cyberport Management Company Limited is not the listed
company, I am afraid that it is inconvenience (inconvenient) for us to
disclose the annual report to public.
Should you have any enquiries, please feel free to contact me. Thank you
very much for your kind attention.
Best Regards,
Tiontee Lo - Senior Customer Services Officer, Facility Management
ISS EastPoint Property Management Limited
Cyberport Facilities Management Office
Unit 401, L4, IT Street, Core A, Cyberport 3, 100 Cyberport Road
Direct : (852) 3166 3530 ; Tel: (852) 3166 3111 ; Fax : (852) 3166 3100
Email: tiontee.lo@hk.issworld.com
Website: http://www.hk.issworld.com/
A member of ISS Facility Services Group
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Profit and Loss Account of HKCD for the year ended 31st March 2006
Hong Kong Cyberport Development Holdings Limited
Consolidated Profit and Loss Account for the year ended 31st March 2006
2004 2005 2006
HK$ HK$ HK$
Turnover 65,367,726 135,843,514 187,774,309
Project income - 1,674,713,591 1,323,491,171
Other revenues 936,250 12,126,034 39,244,398
Total revenues 66,303,976 1,822,683,139 1,550,509,878
Building management
expenses (55,547,267) (76,340,110) (89,097,260)
Staff costs (25,306,124) (53,702,809) (62,246,674)
Information technology
facilities
maintenance fee (20,049,290) (25,942,884) (24,476,861)
Government rent and
rates (4,036,354) (17,350,524) (11,489,066)
Other operating expenses (15,220,382) (51,293,486) (56,834,281)
Operating expenses
before depreciation (120,159,417) (224,629,813) (244,144,142)
Operating profit/ (loss)
before depreciation (53,855,441) 1,598,053,326 1,306,365,736
Depreciation (105,165,583) (171,679,660) (257,719,823)
Finance costs - - (36,689)
Profit/ (loss) before
income tax (159,021,024) 1,426,373,666 1,048,609,224
Income tax expenses - (292,585,413) (231,122,822)
Profit/ (loss) for the year (159,021,024) 1,133,788,253 817,486,402
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Appendix 20 Plan in Grant of Conditions of Cyberport Project
Scale 1:2000
Residential
Portion 2
Residential
Portion 1
Cyberport
Portion 2
Cyberport
Portion 1
Cyberport
Portion 3
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